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ABSTRACT 
Prisons have long been recognized as an environment ripe for radicalization. In some 
cases, individuals radicalized while in prison have later committed acts of terrorism. 
While many countries employ deradicalization programs in their prisons, the United 
States relies on the timely reporting of terrorism-related intelligence from prison officials, 
in hopes of disrupting the terroristic acts.  
In 2011, California Governor Jerry Brown enacted a law that prospectively 
directed thousands of convicted persons to county jails instead of state prison. Inmates 
can now spend decades in the county jails, where the possibility of traditional prison 
radicalization may now occur. Evidence indicates that many jails are not prepared to 
identify and report this activity. Jails typically have no programs or measures in place to 
counter radicalization. 
This thesis examines the programs in the federal Bureau of Prisons, the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and the Los Angeles County jail system. 
Data from these entities was collected and examined for “smart practices” that could be 
employed in county jails. Recommendations are made that will assist county jail 
personnel with developing a program to ensure the timely, accurate, and lawful reporting 
of radicalization efforts that may take place in their facilities. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Radicalization, the process by which Westerners embrace the teachings of the radical 
Islam, is of great concern to U.S. officials. The motivations for radicalization vary, but 
experts agree that prison environments are conducive for such a conversion of ideology. 
A number of former prisoners who radicalized while incarcerated have later been arrested 
for terrorism-related crimes.  
The federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) houses all persons sentenced for the 
violation of federal crimes, and the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR) was historically responsible for housing anyone sentenced to 
more than one year for the violation of California statutes. Some prisoners in those 
systems serve very lengthy sentences, including “life without the possibility of parole.” A 
number of noteworthy terrorists were found to have radicalized during these periods of 
incarceration. 
Authorities in the United States do not employ deradicalization programs, but 
instead rely on the timely reporting of radicalization efforts in hopes of disrupting or 
preventing terrorist acts from occurring. Both the BOP and the CDCR have programs in 
place that ensure that their staff receive training in radicalization awareness and that they 
document and disseminate their observations in an appropriate, timely, and lawful 
manner.  
County jails in California traditionally house inmates pending trial and those 
sentenced to one year or less. In 2011, however, California Governor Jerry Brown 
enacted the Public Safety Realignment Act (AB109), which directed that inmates meeting 
certain criteria serve their sentences in county jails instead of state prison. It is estimated 
that 30,000 felons per year would be sentenced to county jails instead of state prison. 
These individuals, who are being referred to as “county jail prisoners,” thus can spend 
decades in county jails. One prisoner is currently serving 44 years in a Los Angeles 
County jail. 
 xiii 
County jails in California historically did not encounter incidents of 
radicalization, likely because of the shorter periods of incarceration. That situation is 
likely to change with the lengthy sentences now being served in county jails. While some 
jail systems in California, including at least one large one and several smaller ones, 
remain unprepared or under-prepared to address radicalization, the Los Angeles County 
system has taken appropriate measures to ensure proper monitoring and reporting of 
radicalization activities.  
This research examined the smart practices currently in place in the BOP, the 
California Department of Corrections, and the Los Angeles County jail system. While the 
dynamics of their respective populations are diverse, each system had policies and 
procedures that could be employed in various jails systems. 
The BOP houses both known terrorists and prisoners with ties to terrorism. It has 
the ability to segregate these prisoners, and securely house them in a manner that allows 
for close monitoring that limits the prisoners’ ability to recruit or radicalize other 
prisoners. It has policies in place intended to reduce the likelihood of outside influences 
from facilitating the radicalization process to include the prohibition of The Noble Quran 
(a radical interpretation of the original version) and the proper vetting of religious service 
providers who have access to the prisoners. The staff receives radicalization awareness 
training on a regular basis and investigators at each facility ensure the proper reporting of 
activities related to radicalization. BOP officials work closely with staff at the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), and the 
Correctional Intelligence Initiative (CII). 
The CDCR does not house those convicted of terrorism-related offenses, as those 
are typically charged in the federal courts, but many documented cases of radicalization 
have occurred within its facilities. For many years, CDCR staff has efficiently monitored 
and reported the activities of prison gangs and their members, and the CDCR found that 
many of those practices were effective in monitoring of radicalization efforts. Like the 
BOP, the CDCR attempts to prevent outside influences from entering the facilities, but its 
policies are less restrictive. For example, The Noble Quran is not on the list of banned 
items. The CDCR receives assistance from the FBI through the California Gang 
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Intelligence Initiative (CGII). This group’s primary mission was the management of gang 
intelligence, but it is now tasked with radicalization intelligence as well. 
The Los Angeles County jails system, with almost 19,000 inmates, is the largest 
jail system in the nation. Out of necessity, the staff has developed an expertise in 
monitoring street and prison gang activity in its facilities. Like the CDCR, the Los 
Angeles jails found that these practices were useful in monitoring and documenting the 
radicalization efforts in their facilities. Reporting of terrorism-related activities is 
performed through the Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) system, which is managed 
by the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC). Jail staff receives radicalization and 
other terrorism-related training, and officials attempt to limit the introduction of outside 
influence that may facilitate radicalization. Los Angeles County has paved the path for 
other jail staff, in California and beyond, who seek to develop programs to ensure that 
they effectively monitor and report radicalization efforts in their facility. 
The research concludes with recommendations regarding support, training, 
monitoring (communications, observations, and activities), reporting and activities 
related to religious services. Following the recommendations outlined in this thesis will 
help ensure that actionable intelligence regarding possible radicalization can and will be 
reported to the proper entity in a timely manner. 
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The most immediate threat is homegrown terrorism, as we’ve seen in the 
Boston marathon. 
–Robert S. Mueller, III 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
August 22, 2013 
 
Over the past few years, several individuals have been arrested for terrorist acts 
after spending time in American jails or prisons. Richard Reid, known as the “shoe 
bomber,” attempted to detonate explosives concealed in his shoe while on a flight from 
Paris to Miami. He was almost certainly radicalized by an Imam while in prison in Great 
Britain, where he converted to Islam.1 Kevin Lamar James was a former street gang 
member turned terrorist. Once a member of the Hoover Street Crips in Los Angeles, he 
formed a group called Jam’yyat Al-Islam Al-Saheeh (JIS) while serving a 10-year 
sentence in Folsom Prison.2 Jose Padilla, a street gang member from Chicago, became a 
radical Islamist while in a Florida prison. He was later arrested for his role in planning to 
detonate a “dirty bomb” (an explosive device containing radioactive material) after 
discussing his plans with Abu Zubaydah, Osama bin Laden’s operations chief.3 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The process by which Westerners embrace the teachings of radical Islam, 
including the acceptance of violence as a means to support terroristic goals, is referred to 
as radicalization.4 Radicalization often occurs in prisons, as custody facilities provide 
fertile grounds for such a conversion. Prisoners seeking anything from protection to a 
1 Frank J. Cilluffo and Gregory Saathoff, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner 
Radicalization (Washington, DC: Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2006), iii. 
2 Robert S. Mueller, Homegrown Terrorism and the Radicalization Process (Phoenix, AZ: McMurry 
Inc., 2006), 563. 
3 Dennis A. Ballas, Prisoner Radicalization, ed. Law Enforcement Bulletin (Washington, DC: Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2010). 
4 Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: 
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization,” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 
1 (2010). 
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sense of identity may align with fellow prisoners, who act as recruiters for terrorist and 
other disruptive organizations.  
Law enforcement and correctional agencies in the United States do not attempt to 
“de-radicalize” prisoners, as officials in several other countries do. Instead, United States 
(U.S.) authorities rely on the collection of radicalization-related intelligence to assist with 
their efforts to disrupt, reduce, or prevent violent terrorist acts. For that reason, complete, 
timely, and accurate reporting of the intelligence is imperative. 
Prison staff in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
(CDCR) receive assistance from two Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) programs in 
their efforts to monitor and report radicalization efforts. The Correctional Intelligence 
Initiative5 and the California Gang Intelligence Initiative6 both assist California prison 
staff with the collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence information. Most jails 
in California, by contrast, receive no such assistance. As such, the jails in California 
remain more open to radicalizers seeking converts to their violent cause, and intelligence 
authorities may be denied crucial insights into the situation inside California’s jails. 
In 2011, the line between prisons and jails was blurred when California Governor 
Jerry Brown directed that inmates meeting certain criteria serve their sentences in county 
jails instead of state prison.7 Inmates are now sentenced to lengthy terms in county jails, 
which likely will result in radicalization efforts taking place in county jails. Most county 
jail administrators lack the resources to develop and maintain a program dedicated to the 
monitoring and reporting of homeland security related issues, and no publicly available 
information indicates that they are addressing radicalization efforts.  
 
5 Mark S. Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study 
of Non-Traditional Faith Groups Final Report (Rockville, MD: National Criminal Justice Reference 
Service, 2007), 105. 
6 Federal Bureau of Investigation, California Gang Intelligence Initiative (Washington, DC: Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2010). 
7 Governor Jerry Brown, 2011 Public Safety Realignment, Sacramento, CA, 2011. 
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This issue warrants further research to determine whether county jail staff is 
prepared to monitor radicalization related efforts and to act on any information 
discovered. If not, the intelligence community could fail to receive valuable homeland 
security information. It is also possible that facility security issues, including potential 
threats to jail staff and other inmates, may not be discovered and prevented.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
How is it possible to ensure that jail staff effectively identify and document 
radicalization efforts occurring in their facilities, and that they report actionable 
homeland security intelligence to the appropriate entity? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
Audrey Cronin, Professor at George Mason University, stated, “Radical Islamists 
will pose a threat to the United States and its interests for a long time to come.”8 Not all 
of these extremists are overseas; the radicalization of U.S. citizens increasingly forms a 
concern for law enforcement and homeland security officials. To address that concern, 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Jeh Johnson recently met with 
Muslim leaders in several cities in an effort to build trust and offer assistance, with the 
goal of reducing radicalization.9 A recent example is Nicholas Teausant, a California 
resident who in March 2014 was arrested as he attempted to leave the United States to 
fight alongside the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).10 He was 
a community college student, a member of the National Guard, and had expressed his 
desire to participate in a violent Jihad.11 He was one of at least seven Americans arrested 
during a 15-month period of 2013 and 2014 while trying to travel to Syria for the same 
8 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” 
International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 7. 
9 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Is Trying to Counter ISIS’ Efforts to Lure Alienated Young Muslims,” New York 
Times, October 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/us/us-is-trying-to-counter-isiss-efforts-to-
lure-alienated-young-muslims.html?_r=0. 
10 Eastern District of California, “San Joaquin County Man Indicted on Charges of Attempting to 
Provide Material Support to Foreign Terrorist Organization,” The United States Attorney’s Office, March 
26, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/usao/cae/news/docs/2014/2014_03/03-26-14Teausant.html. 
11 Leslie Holland, “California Man Arrested Near Canadian Border on Terror Charges,” CNN, March 
17, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/17/us/califorina-terror-arrest/. 
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reason.12 The problem of prisons “breeding” more extreme criminals is well 
documented.13 The same circumstances, without sustained and structured intervention, 
would facilitate religious radicalization. 
The FBI describes prisoner radicalization as a serious problem that will require a 
“multiagency and multidisciplinary response.”14 Experts believe radicalization among 
incarcerated Americans is a problem with potentially serious future security implications. 
Figure 1 shows the statistics related to Muslim-American violence for the years leading 
up to 2012. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Muslim-American Terrorism Suspects and Perpetrators since 9/1115 
 
 
12 Robert Windrem, “Jihad Interrupted: Feds Grab ISIS ‘Wannabes’ Before They Reach Syria,” NBC 
News, September 4, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/jihad-interrupted-feds-grab-isis-
wannabes-they-reach-syria-n195171.l. 
13 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York: 
New York Police Department, 2007), 41. 
14 Ballas, Prisoner Radicalization. 
15 Charles Kurzman, Muslim-American Terrorism: Declining Further (Durham, NC: Triangle Center 
on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2013). 
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No data show whether any of these perpetrators were radicalized in prison, but 
with more arrests and more incarcerations, more radical Muslims will find their way 
behind bars in the United States. As such, extensive improvement is needed in the way 
federal, state, and local entities address this problem. 
In 2011, California Governor Jerry Brown enacted the Public Safety Realignment 
Act (AB109), which directed that inmates meeting certain criteria serve their sentences in 
county jails instead of state prison.16 The revisions were prospective (no state prisoners 
were transferred to county jails), but it was estimated that 30,000 felons per year would 
now be sentenced to county jails, instead of state prison.17  
The inmates qualifying for the new sentencing were described as “newly 
convicted low-level offenders without current or prior serious or violent offenses.”18 The 
law required further that their offenses, prior or current, be non-serious, non-violent, and 
non-sexual. However, a lack of serious, violent, or sexual criminal history is not 
indicative of a lack of problems in the future. While the inmate population in the county 
jails soared to a record 58,000 inmates (7,600 over their rated capacity), so did reports of 
assaults. Approximately 2,000 more inmate-on-inmate assaults occurred during the first 
year of realignment, and 164 more assaults on staff.19 
1. Prisons Versus Jails
State prisons in California are managed by the CDCR. That agency operates 34 
prisons throughout the state, and at the time of this research, it was housing 
approximately 187,000 prisoners.20 Prisoners whose sentences range from one year to 
16 Brown, 2011 Public Safety Realignment. 
17 Magnus Lofstrom, Joan Petersilia, and Steven Raphael, Evaluating the Effects of California’s 
Corrections Realignment on Public Safety (San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California, 2012), 
2. 
18 Brown, 2011 Public Safety Realignment. 
19 Don Thompson, “AP Exclusive: Jails House 1,100 Long-Term Inmates,” San Jose Mercury News, 
February 28, 2013. 
20 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Monthly Report of Population 
(Sacramento, CA: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2013). 
5 
life without the possibility of parole have historically been housed at CDCR. 
Additionally, 748 condemned prisoners are housed at San Quentin’s “death row.” 
Historically, county jails in California were intended to house pre-trial detainees 
and convicted inmates who had been sentenced to one year or less. The responsibility for 
operating the county jails rests with the elected Sheriff (except in those counties that have 
created a department of corrections). California Government Code section 26605 states 
in part that: “The sheriff shall take charge of and be the sole and exclusive authority 
to keep the county jail and the prisoners in it.” 
California has 57 different jail systems (the state has 58 counties but one small 
county contracts with two neighboring counties for jail services). While statewide 
minimum jail standards exist to ensure that the health and welfare of the inmates is 
addressed, vast differences exist in the policies and procedures at these facilities. Some of 
these differences are a result of the size of their operation. The Los Angeles County jail 
system houses more than 19,000 inmates21 and Sierra County averages six per day. 
Clearly, the management of jails is not a “one size fits all.” 
Sacramento County’s Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center was designed to house 
inmates sentenced to one year or less. Since the implementation of Assembly Bill 109, 
Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109), the longest sentence in Sacramento County is 
for 17 years, and approximately 40 inmates are serving sentences between 5 and 10 
years.22 One inmate is serving a 43-year sentence in the Los Angeles County jail for drug 
trafficking.23 With the change in sentencing in California, the jails are becoming known 
as “county jail prisons.” 
With the increased periods of incarceration in California jails, and considerably 
fewer rehabilitation programs available compared to state prisons, radicalization efforts 
21 Los Angeles County Civil Grand Jury, 2012–2013 Civil Grand Jury: Final Report (Los Angeles, 
CA: Los Angeles County Civil Grand Jury, 2013), 185. 
22 Milo Fitch, in discussion with the author, Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center, Elk Grove, CA, 
August 21, 2013. 
23 Thompson, “AP Exclusive: Jails House 1,100 Long-Term Inmates.” 
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will likely increase in the county jails. Frank Cilluffo, director of the Homeland Security 
Policy Institute, and co-chairman of their Prisoner Radicalization Task Force, stated, 
“The threat of prisoner radicalization is….even more paramount for state and local 
officials.”24 He also stated that while the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 
(LASD) has seen an increase in radicalization, the lack of trained experts results in poor 
investigations and intelligence sharing efforts.25 
A majority of the research indicates a possibility that radicalization efforts may 
increase in the county jails in California as a result of the Public Safety Realignment Act, 
but it is possible that it may actually decrease. The first reason is that the affected 
prisoners are serving their sentences in the county in which they were arrested, convicted, 
and sentenced. Often, it is the county in which they lived, which keeps them closer to 
friends and relatives. When these same prisoners were sent to state prison, their locations 
were determined by a classification system that did not take their county of residence into 
consideration. Regular visits from family and friends may decrease their sense of 
dispossession, and therefore, reduce their need to form an allegiance with radical 
prisoners. The second reason radicalization may be reduced is better living conditions. 
Neil Smelser, emeritus professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, 
wrote, “The underlying basis of terrorism is a shared sense of dispossession and 
suffering.”26 Is it possible that if the living conditions in the county jails were better than 
those found in prisons, one of the motivating factors of radicalization would diminish? 
The history of unacceptable conditions in the California prison system is well 
documented.27 Severe overcrowding was the driving force for Governor Brown’s 
realignment plan. According to the CDCR’s own newsletter, 
24 Cilluffo and Saathoff, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization, 8. 
25 Ibid., 9. 
26 Neil J. Smelser, The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007).  
27 Staff, “CDCR Unveils Plan to Cut Spending by Billions, Meet Court Orders,” California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, April 24, 2012, http://www.insidecdcr.ca.gov/2012/04/cdcr-
unveils-plan-to-cut-spending-by-billions-meet-court-orders/; KQED Staff, “Judge Closes Prison Abuse 
Case after 20 Years,” KQED, March 22, 2011, http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2011/03/22/judge-closes-prison-
abuse-case-after-20-years/. 
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CDCR has responded to a string of class-action lawsuits dating back to 
1990 that challenge the levels of medical, mental health and dental care 
for inmates. In 2006, federal courts appointed a receiver to bring health 
care up to constitutional standards. Mental health care is overseen by a 
Special Master and dental care is monitored by Court Experts.28 
This development may not be the only byproduct of overcrowding. Mark S. Hamm wrote 
that he found “a pattern of radicalization among Islamic gang members in California’s 
massively overcrowded maximum security prisons.”29 
This is not to suggest that jail administrators take no actions and assume that this 
possibility will become a reality. In fact, radicalization efforts will not immediately ping 
on the jail administrator’s radar, as those inmates tend to avoid breaking the rules so as 
not to draw attention to themselves.30 If for no other reason, the safety of county jail staff 
should be a motivating factor. Secondarily, addressing the possibility of radicalization 
will ensure that intelligence continues to be disseminated to the proper entities. 
2. Rehabilitation Efforts in Prisons Versus Jails 
Since the average length of incarceration in the county jails was typically less 
than one year (the exception being those awaiting trial for serious offenses), rehabilitation 
efforts were historically minimal. Some counties offer General Education Development 
(GED) programs, but often, the inmates were either released (“time served”) or 
transferred to state prison prior to the completion of the program. Some counties also 
offer vocational education programs like landscape maintenance, welding, and food 
service. These offerings are scarce, and until more programs become available, the 
inmates serving lengthy sentences in county jails become ideal candidates for 
radicalization. 
28 Staff, “CDCR Unveils Plan to Cut Spending by Billions, Meet Court Orders.” 
29 Mark S. Hamm, Locking up Terrorists: Three Models for Controlling Prisoner Radicalization 
(Indiana, IN: Indiana State University, 2011), 4. 
30 Cilluffo and Saathoff, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization, 9. 
 8 
                                                 
The notion that “idle hands are the devil’s workshop”31 has not escaped the prison 
system. Most prisoners are afforded the opportunity to participate in a host of programs 
intended to “change the criminal mindset, so offenders leave prison prepared to be 
healthy, productive members of society.”32 In fact, in 2005, the word “rehabilitation” was 
added to the name of the agency formerly known as the California Department of 
Corrections. Ian M. Cuthbertson, senior fellow and director of the Counterterrorism 
Project at the World Policy Institute asserts that vocational training and support groups 
assist with preventing radicalization in prison.33 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An ever-growing body of literature examines the radicalization process, with a 
substantial portion looking at the individuals and what attracted them to their extremist 
beliefs.34 Extensive research has been devoted specifically to radicalization that occurs in 
prisons around the world. 
1. Causes and Motivations for Radicalization  
Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Senior Intelligence Analysts with the New York 
Police Department, identify four phases of the radicalization process, in which a person 
seeks religious guidance, begins to identify with radical Islam, intensifies these beliefs, 
and ultimately, becomes willing to commit violent acts in furtherance of these extreme 
beliefs.35 Silber and Bhatt wrote: 
It (ideology) defines the conflict, guides movements, identifies the issues, 
drives recruitment, and is the basis for action. In many cases, ideology 
31 While not a direct quote from the bible, the apostle Paul notes that those who waste their time in 
idleness or in a non-productive manner are easily led into sin. 
32 Division of Rehabilitative Programs, “Frequently Asked Questions,” California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2013, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/rehabilitation/faqs.html#rehabilitation. 
33 Ian M. Cuthbertson, “Prisons and the Education of Terrorists,” World Policy Journal, Fall 2004, 20. 
34 Steven M. Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich, and Joseph Simone, “Surveying American State Police 
Agencies About Lone Wolves, Far-Right Criminality, and Far-Right and Islamic Jihadist Criminal 
Collaboration,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 11 (2010): 1035. 
35 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, 6–7. 
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also determines target selection and informs what will be done and how it 
will be carried out.36 
Most researchers agree that radicalization is a “process:” Sophia Moskalenko 
describes the “pyramid,”37 Fathali Moghaddam a “staircase,”38 and Zeyno Baran refers 
to a “conveyor belt.”39 The process often involves an increase in viewing ideological 
propaganda, associating with radical militants, and espousing more conservative views of 
Islam.40 Brian Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the President of the Rand Corporation, stated, 
“Terrorists do not fall from the sky. They emerge from a set of strongly held beliefs. 
They are radicalized. Then they become terrorists.”41 
2. Why Does Radicalization Occur in Prisons?  
Most studies about prison radicalization point toward the disaffected, 
disenchanted prisoners seeking a sense of purpose or a means of protection.42 Often, they 
are seeking a sense of self-importance and/or a need to belong to a group.43 For these 
reasons, the prison environment is conducive to radicalization. 
Islamic radicals have not ignored this potential “university.”44 They have 
recruited and trained prisoners to commit violent acts.45 John Pistole, while assigned as 
the FBI’s executive assistant director of counterterrorism/counterintelligence, called U.S. 
 
36 Ibid., 18. 
37 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways 
toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 417. 
38 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American 
Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005): 161. 
39 Zeyno Baran, “Fighting the War of Ideas,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2005. 
40 Risa A. Brooks, “Muslim “Homegrown” Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the 
Threat?,” International Security 36, no. 2 (2011): 13. 
41 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. And U.K.: An 
Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process (Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies, 2009). 
42 Cilluffo and Saathoff, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization, 5. 
43 Ibid., 1. 
44 Cuthbertson, “Prisons and the Education of Terrorists,” 15. 
45 Ibid. 
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correctional institutions a “viable venue for radicalization and recruitment” for al-
Qaeda.46 Many right-wing extremist groups were founded in prisons (Posse Comitatus, 
the Order, Aryan Nations, etc.), so it is no surprise that Jihadist groups exploit this 
captive audience as well.47  
A special report by the Homeland Security Policy Institute indicated that the lack 
of Muslim religious service providers could result in the wrong providers being allowed 
access to the prisoners.48 Much of the research available refers to literature and 
propaganda being introduced into prisons by groups known to support terrorist causes, 
and nefarious actors visiting under the guise of religious service providers are no 
exception.49 
Frank Cilluffo and Audrey Cronin, professors at George Mason University, have 
both concluded that radicalization is and will remain a serious problem. Cilluffo has 
written that the potential for radicalization of prisoners in the United States poses a threat 
of unknown magnitude to the national security of the United States (see Figure 2).50 
Cronin states, “Radical Islamists will pose a threat to the United States and its interests 
for a long time to come.”51 
46 Subcomittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, Terrorism: Radical Islamic 
Influence of Chaplaincy of the U.S. Military and Prisons, 108–443, October 14, 2003. 
47 Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash, and Andrew J. Whitehead, “Radicalization: Behind Bars and 
Beyond Borders,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 13, no. 2 (2007): 114. 
48 Cilluffo and Saathoff, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization, iv. 
49 Ibid., 1. 
50 Cilluffo and Saathoff, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization, i. 
51 Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” 7. 
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Figure 2.  Linking Prisoner Radicalization and Terrorism52 
3. Radicalization in County Jails 
Relatively little literature is available that addresses the identification of 
radicalization efforts in county jails. Lieutenant Jennifer Barsh offered a picture of the 
programs in the Los Angeles County jail system in her Naval Postgraduate School 
Master’s thesis titled “Creation of a Homeland Security Jail Information Model.”53 Her 
research was a comparison of intelligence collection and dissemination models. She 
analyzed the Jail Intelligence Team (JIT), Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO), and Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to determine the best model for use in a jail environment. 
Her recommendation was a JTTF/JIT homeland security jail intelligence model.  
52 “Linking Prisoner Radicalization and Terrorism: The JIS Case,” accessed October 14, 2014, 
http://www.nij.gov/journals/261/pages/prisoner-radicalization-jis-sidebar.aspx. 
53 Jennifer Barsh, “Creation of a Homeland Security Jail Information Model” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2012). 
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The program Barsh created was intended capitalize on the recently arrested 
inmates with “real-time” information. She wrote: 
The jail system provides a rare opportunity to acquire intelligence that is 
both current and time sensitive since the inmate is jailed directly after 
being arrested. Timely intelligence describes activity, relationships, and 
situations that currently exist or that are ongoing at the moment the 
information is acquired. The jail system offers an opportunity to gather 
real-time information since the inmate was removed from the existing 
environment and placed directly in a jail. Inmates possess real-time 
information about criminal activity occurring in a particular jurisdiction 
because they recently were part of that environment.54 
References to radicalization in her research primarily address inmates previously 
encountered in their system. As AB 109 was signed into law at the time she was 
concluding her research (Fall 2011), the Los Angeles County jails had not yet begun to 
see the lengthy sentences that would result from Governor Brown’s Public Safety 
Realignment Program. As a result, her research does not address the issues central to the 
current research. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This research involved several methods of inquiry. The authors’ observations and 
personal interactions with staff from county jails, the CDCR, the FBI, and the Central 
California Intelligence Center (CCIC), coupled with the collection of policies and 
procedures from these entities, helped identify opportunities for improvement in 
preventing problems resulting from radicalization in county jails. This research relied 
primarily on the examination of “smart practices,” which are described as follows. 
Appreciative inquiry (AI) (also described in a following section) provided guidance while 
examining the smart practices. 
• Data Collection 
Data was collected through contact with local, state, and federal employees whose 
assignments include jail, prisons, intelligence, and radicalization. Direct contact with 
54 Ibid., 6–7. 
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these well-placed sources ensured that the data they provided was timely and accurate. 
When possible, copies of policies were obtained. 
• Smart Practices 
A “smart practice” takes advantage of something working well elsewhere under 
similar conditions. References are often made to “best practices,” but more often than 
not, research has not been conducted to validate that claim. For that reason, Eugene 
Bardash asserts that “smart practices” is a more appropriate description.55 
• Appreciative Inquiry 
In their book, Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Approach to Building Cooperative 
Capacity, Barret and Fry describe AI as “a strength-based approach to capacity 
building.”56 It involves asking questions from a positive stance in the hope of gaining 
knowledge that will result in increased cooperative capacity. This method of research 
provided a positive approach to evaluate smart practices. 
• Data Analysis 
Data analysis will list the main conclusions drawn from the research, and identify 
how that may be applied at the county jail level. The methods employed in the Los 
Angeles County jails, state prisons (CDCR), and federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) were 
analyzed, and both the positive and negative aspects were examined to determine why 
they were or were not successful. Patterns of success were merged to form the conclusion 
and recommendations. 
F. THEORETICAL SENSITIVITY: ADDRESSING RESEARCH BIAS 
When conducting research, and more importantly, analyzing data, the possibility 
exists for the biased distortion of data to serve the researcher’s interests. Prior to 
commencing this research, he was aware that state and federal prison systems had 
55 Eugene Bardash, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012), Kindle edition. 
56 Frank J. Barrett and Ronald E. Fry, Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Approach to Building 
Cooperative Capacity (Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute Publications, 2012), Kindle edition. 
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programs in place to identify and report radicalization efforts in their facilities and that 
most county jails (specifically in Sacramento) did not. This research could have easily 
been constructed with the goal of adapting the state and federal policies, expanding upon 
them to ensure even greater security, and recommending that they be implemented in 
California’s jail system. Stated another way, the researcher’s professional experiences 
could easily influence his analysis of the data and the resulting recommendations. It is 
entirely possible that some of the programs examined would not be ideally implemented 
at the county jail level.  
The researcher has been a law enforcement officer for 30 years, and several of his 
assignments have had a direct nexus to the topic of this research. In 1989, he created a 
jail intelligence program at the Sacramento County Main Jail. He attended the California 
State Department of Justice’s Criminal Intelligence Institute, and received extensive 
training in gangs, organized crime, and other related topics. He later attended the pilot 
terrorism course offered by the California Office of Emergency Services.  
For the past three years, the CCIC, one of six intelligence fusion centers in 
California, has organizationally been within his chain of command. The Director of the 
center reports to an Executive Board, but the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department 
(the researcher’s employer) acts as the fiduciary for the management of the grants that 
fund the center’s operation. Additionally, many of the employees in the center work for 
his agency. Thus, he has been intimately involved with the operations at the center. The 
FBI, which controls the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) in which 
the center operates, conducted the background investigation necessary to afford him a 
Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) clearance. As a result, when 
the FBI deems it necessary to brief someone from his agency on a sensitive homeland 
security investigation in progress, he received that briefing. He then provides his Sheriff 
with an unclassified version for his situational awareness. Additionally, he has been a 
TLO for about five years, and is privy to all the suspicious activity reports (SARs) 
submitted in the CCIC’s 34 county areas of responsibility (AOR). 
These experiences have given him an excellent working knowledge of homeland 
security related issues in his region and beyond. They have also exposed him to the 
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details of sensitive homeland security-related investigations, including the devastating 
consequences of inadequate intelligence sharing. As a result, his recommendations 
following this research may easily have included more restrictive policies, to the 
detriment of rehabilitative efforts and facility harmony. To reduce observer’s bias, he 
remained mindful of this potential while collecting and analyzing the data. He also asked 
that his thesis advisors be mindful of this potential while they viewed his work through a 
different lens. 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
• Chapter II—Monitoring Efforts in the Prison Systems 
Chapter II explores the efforts to monitor and report radicalization efforts in both 
the federal BOP and the CDCR. 
• Chapter III—Monitoring Efforts in the Los Angeles County Jails System 
Chapter III examines the Los Angeles county jail system and its attempts to 
monitor and report radicalization-related activity. 
• Chapter IV—Analysis of Key Issues 
This chapter initiates the discourse about the importance of reporting 
radicalization activities, and examines the smart practices of three correctional systems. 
• Chapter V—Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter V provides recommendations based on the finding of this research. 
Topics include securing agency support, training, monitoring, reporting, and religious 
issues. This chapter concludes with some indicators that many of the jails in California 
are not prepared to address this very important issue. 
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II. MONITORING EFFORTS IN THE PRISON SYSTEMS 
Researchers paid little attention to prison radicalization until after September 11, 
2001 (9/11). For example, in 2000, an al-Qa’ida training manual titled Military Studies in 
the Jihad (Holy War) against the Tyrants was located in an apartment in Manchester, 
England. The document made clear the fact that al-Qa’ida was interested in Western 
prisoners as candidates for “conversion to Islam because they may harbor hostility toward 
their governments.”57 The manual aroused little sustained interest among scholars or 
practitioners at the time. 
An estimated 80 percent of prisoners who seek religion while incarcerated turn to 
the Muslim faith.58 Many are attracted to radical versions of Islam, which preach 
violence and hatred of non-Muslims. Prison authorities at the federal and state level have 
created procedures to address the radicalization. While sometimes controversial and 
probably incomplete, they represent an attempt to address this troubling situation.  
A. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 
The federal BOP was established within the U.S. Department of Justice in 1930. It 
was tasked with the “management and regulation of all Federal penal and correctional 
institutions,”59 which amounted to 11 facilities at that time. Now, 111 facilities 
(including those that are privately operated) house more than 216,000 federal prisoners. 
Half of those prisoners are serving sentences for drug offenses, followed in frequency by 
weapons offenses, explosives, and sex offenses. The vast majority of prisoners are 
serving a sentence of between five and 10 years.60 
57 Mark S. Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat 
(New York: New York University Press, 2013), 43. 
58 Nawal H. Ammar, Robert R. Weaver, and Sam Saxon, “Muslims in Prison: A Case Study from 
Ohio State Prisons,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and and Comparative Criminology 48, no. 
4 (2004): 423.  




                                                 
The BOP staff must also manage known terrorists serving lengthy sentences in 
their custody. Approximately 362 convicted terrorists were in custody in the United 
States in 2011 (current estimates place this figure at more than 400 prisoners today), 
more than are currently housed in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp (GITMO).61 
Maintaining a safe housing environment for the known terrorists and preventing others 
from radicalizing (or facilitating radicalization) is an on-going challenge. 
1. Levels of Classification and Housing 
Persons convicted of terrorism-related offenses, and those suspected of facilitating 
radicalization efforts are held only in maximum-security facilities (the BOP operates 
prisons classified as minimum- and medium-security, as well.). Within the maximum-
security facilities, the BOP operates three types of segregated housing. 
• Special housing units (SHU)—prisoners pending transfer to other 
facilities, being disciplined for rule violations, etc. 
• Special management units (SMU)—a four-level program where prisoners’ 
restrictions can fluctuate. 
• Administrative maximum (ADX)—prisoners who require the highest level 
of security. 
The segregation of prisoners with ties to terrorism was born out of some very 
harsh criticism of the BOP after 9/11. Three federal prisoners, who were housed in ADX 
Florence for their role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, wrote almost 100 letters 
to Islamic militants outside the prison. Some of the letters praised bin Laden, some went 
to Spanish prisoners tied to the Madrid train bombings; none of this communication was 
monitored. The government’s after-action report noted that this failure to monitor 
communications resulted in “little or no proactive intelligence on the activities of the 
terrorist inmates.”62 
61 Scott Shane, “Beyond Guantanamo, a Web of Prisons for Terrorism Inmates,” New York Times, 
December 10, 2011. 
62 Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat, 163. 
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Approximately seven percent of the BOP’s prisoners (12,460) were held in one of 
the segregation units as of February 2013; of them, 435 were in ADX. ADX, or, 
Supermax, is currently home to Faisal Shahzad (2010 Times Square attempted bomber), 
Zacarias Moussaoui (an al-Qa’ida operative), Richard Reid (the so-called shoe bomber), 
and Ted Kaczynski (the Unabomber).63 
The BOP manages prisoners with ties to terrorism by “confining them in more 
secure conditions and closely monitoring their communications.”64 Their policy is to 
house prisoners with terrorist ties in a manner that limits the opportunities for them to 
recruit or radicalize other prisoners. To accomplish this task, they created two specialized 
units, referred to as communications management units (CMUs) at Terre Haute, Indiana, 
and Marion, Illinois. Prisoners are transferred to one of the CMUs for “being convicted of 
or associated with international or domestic terrorism; repeated attempts to contact 
victims or witnesses; a history of soliciting minors for sexual activity; a court-ordered 
communication restriction; coordinating illegal activities from inside prison and a 
disciplinary history that includes continued abuse of communications methods.”65 
Visitors are allowed no physical contact with prisoners, and mail, e-mail, and phone calls 
are strictly monitored to both prevent inmates from either radicalizing or orchestrating 
events outside of the prison.66  
A majority of the prisoners housed in these units are Muslim, which has led to 
much controversy and litigation.67 In January 2009, Sabri Benkahla, Seifullah Chapman, 
and Randall Royer filed a lawsuit alleging that their confinement there was 
unconstitutional.68 In June 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit 
regarding the restrictions on Muslim worship at Terre Haute.69 In addition, in March 
63 Shane, “Beyond Guantanamo, a Web of Prisons for Terrorism Inmates.” 
64 Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, 1st, H.R. 1955, 2. 
65 Alia Malek, “Gitmo in the Heartland,” The Nation, March 28, 2011. 
66 Shane, “Beyond Guantanamo, a Web of Prisons for Terrorism Inmates.” 
67 Ibid. 
68 Margot Williams, “TIMELINE: The History of ‘Guantanamo North,’” National Public Radio, 
March 3, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/133629696/timeline-the-history-of-guantanamo-north. 
69 Ibid. 
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2010, the Center for Constitutional Rights challenged the legality of the CMUs on behalf 
of four prisoners housed there. Ibrahim Hooper, a spokesman for the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations, referred to them as “Muslim management units.”70 
According to Traci Billingsley, a BOP spokeswoman, however, the units were not 
created for any specific religious group, but were “necessary to ensure the safety, security 
and orderly operation of correctional facilities, and protection of the public.”71 
Justice Department correspondent Carrie Johnson, in her National Public Radio 
story “Guantanamo North: Inside Secretive U.S. Prisons,” wrote, “Guards and cameras 
watch the CMU inmates’ every move. Every word they speak is picked up by hidden 
microphones and their movements captured by video cameras—all monitored by their 
Counterterrorism Unit in Martinsburg, West Virginia.”72 Appropriation documents and 
congressional testimony indicate that the BOP spent more than $14 million for the 
monitoring of these prisoners in 2010.73 
Unfortunately, a potential unintended consequence may arise with housing 
prisoners in the CMU. According to Mark S. Hamm, former Arizona prison warden and 
current professor of criminology at Indiana State University, “Other nations have found 
that physically separating terrorist prisoners from the larger prison population can 
actually intensify radicalization.”74 This separation can be problematic when prisoners 
are transferred to another facility or are released from custody altogether. A 2011 
National Public Radio investigation was able to identify 120 current and former prisoners 
who were, or had been, housed in one of the CMUs. According to their report, only half 
of those identified were still housed in a CMU. Thirty-two prisoners had transferred to 
other prisons and 25 had been released from custody.75 Most of the 120 CMU prisoners 
70 Shane, “Beyond Guantanamo, a Web of Prisons for Terrorism Inmates.” 
71 Ibid. 
72 Carrie Johnson, “‘Guantanamo North’: Inside Secretive U.S. Prisons,” National Public Radio, 
March 3, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134168714/guantanamo-north-inside-u-s-secretive-prisons. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat, 177. 




                                                 
will one day be free, as only 10 were identified as being sentenced to “life” in prison. 
Any of them housed in a CMU because of a connection to terrorism may now be more 
motivated to cause harm to Americans.  
2. Religious Services and Literature 
Prisoners have a right to practice their faith while in custody, and the institutions 
are required to facilitate their worship. Both paid providers and volunteers, generically 
referred to as chaplains, facilitate the services at each BOP facility. The mission of the 
chaplaincy is: 
...to accommodate the free exercise of religion by providing pastoral care 
to all Federal inmates and facilitate the opportunity to pursue individual 
religious beliefs and practices in accordance with the law, Federal 
regulations and Bureau of Prisons policy. Chaplains will provide religious 
worship, education, counseling, spiritual direction, support and crisis 
intervention to accommodate the diverse religious needs of inmates. When 
appropriate, pastoral care and subject matter expertise may be extended to 
staff.76 
In 2006, the BOP only employed 10 Muslim chaplains for the entire prison 
system. As a result, more often than not, prisoners take on the leadership role. When that 
leader subscribes to radical beliefs, he has a captive audience to spread his message. 
Often, this type of leadership role is the first exposure some prisoners have to Islam (or, 
“Prislam”), and they lack the ability to compare it to any other teachings.77 
To reduce the introduction of personnel who would encourage and facilitate 
radicalization, attempts are made to vet all service providers and volunteers who have 
access to the prisoners. This group includes the providers of religious services. The 
BOP’s standards for religious service providers are the most restrictive of the three 
systems examined in this research. The chaplains must meet the same background 
standards as a federal law enforcement officer. In additions, applicants must: 
76 Federal Bureau of Prisons, Ministry of B.O.P. Chaplains, ed. Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2004), 1. 
77 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization: Are 
Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?, September 19, 2006, 7. 
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• Be ordained or a member of an ecclesiastically recognized religious 
institutes 
• Pass a physical exam 
• Possess a bachelor’s degree and a Master of Divinity degree (or 
equivalent) 
• Must have at least two years of pastoral/spiritual leadership experience 
• Have ecclesiastical endorsement (following a minimum of two years of 
association with that endorsing body) 
Some religions do not have a national endorsing entity or person. In these 
situations, the approval is decided by the BOP’s Chaplaincy Administrator.78  
BOP chaplains may not defer the leadership role to clergy from the community, 
nor are prisoners allowed to lead worship services.79 However, if no community chaplain 
(paid or volunteer) is available for that specific faith, inmates may coordinate the 
program under the supervision of the chaplain of another faith. This supervision is 
described as “frequent visual surveillance of the group and at least intermittent in-room 
supervision.”80  
The BOP has also attempted to dissuade radicalization by banning radical 
literature, including The Noble Quran, from its facilities. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, 
Director of the Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization at the Foundation for 
Defense of Democracies, wrote that The Noble Quran “uniquely advances a radical 
interpretation of the Muslim holy book through the use of footnotes and bracketed 
material that does not appear in the Arabic text.”81 In his testimony before the Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Gartenstein-Ross said,  
78 Federal Bureau of Prisons, Chaplain’s Employment Program Statement, ed. Federal Bureau of 
Prisons (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2001), 1. 
79 Ibid., 2. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Daniel Pipes, “The U.S. Bureau of Prisons Explains Jihad,” Middle East Forum, February 10, 2005, 
http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/02/the-us-bureau-of-prisons-explains-jihad. 
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At the heart of any concerted Islamic literature program is distribution of 
the Qur’an. Al Haramain distributed a Wahhabi/Salafi version, known as 
the Noble Qur’an, that was translated into English by Muhammad Taqi-
ud-Din Al-Hilali and Muhammad Muhsin Khan. This version was known 
for containing numerous interpolations not present in the original Arabic. 
Although ostensibly designed to explain the verses, these interpolations in 
fact pushed the meaning in a radical direction, one which was suffused 
with contempt for non-Muslims (particularly Jews and Christians), and 
one which was dedicated to fostering the global jihad.82 
BOP Program Statement P5360.09 (Religious Beliefs and Practices) explicitly prohibits 
disparagement of other religions, which is the basis for their ban of The Noble Quran. 
3. Monitoring and Reporting 
In their attempt to ensure that federal prisoners are not radicalized or recruited for 
terrorist causes, BOP officials work very closely with the FBI, the National Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (through the Correctional Intelligence Initiative, or CII), and other 
law enforcement and intelligence entities. To accomplish their goal, they have enhanced 
their communications monitoring systems, identification of disruptive prisoners, and their 
intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities. They “monitor, record, and 
translate if necessary, all telephone communications (except attorney-client 
conversations) involving inmates with terrorist ties.”83 The Counterterrorism Unit in 
West Virginia ensures that all the terrorist’s telephone calls are monitored. All 
intelligence of potential value is forwarded to the FBI. They also monitor all mail sent 
from or delivered to terrorist inmates. Mail is read, translated, and analyzed for 
intelligence. Any suspicious content is sent to the FBI before any further processing. 
Two BOP employees are assigned to the CII at the National Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (NJTTF). The goal of the CII is to “detect, deter, and disrupt the radicalization and 
82 Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? Hearing Before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 109th Cong., 2nd sess. 
(2006), accessed October 13, 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg30597/html/CHRG-
109shrg30597.htm. 
83 Radicalization, Information Sharing and Community Outreach: Protecting the Homeland from 
Homegown Terror, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, 
2007. 
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recruiting of inmates.”84 The program trains correctional administrators at the federal, 
state, and local levels, exchanges intelligence, and shares best practices related to the 
prevention of radicalization. The CII also attempts to identify and disrupt any attempts by 
inmates, religious providers, and others to radicalize other prisoners. 
The line staff conduct monitoring at the other BOP facilities. In addition to the 
initial training they receive upon hire, they receive training annually, which often 
includes components that address facility security. Since 2004, they have all received 
“Terrorism Management and Response” training annually and religious service providers 
teach an awareness course related to speech, language, and behaviors that could indicate 
radical ideology.85 
The Martinsburg Counterterrorism Unit produces intelligence-related documents 
and disseminates them to BOP staff. They have also provided “Terrorism Training for 
Law Enforcement” videos to all BOP facilities. Additionally, each facility has at least one 
special investigative agent and/or supervisor who oversees all security threat group and 
terrorist activity. This employee also serves as a liaison to the FBI, the U.S. Marshals 
Service and other federal entities. 
Terrorists who plot to kill Americans typically receive life sentences; however, 
more than 300 prisoners with lesser sentences (typically for “providing material support 
for terrorist activities”) have been released from federal custody. In an effort to deter 
them from engaging in further acts of terrorism, FBI agents interview them prior to 
release, and probation officers monitor them for many years.86  
84 Ibid. 
85 Radicalization, Information Sharing and Community Outreach: Protecting the Homeland from 
Homegown Terror, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, 
2007. 
86 Shane, “Beyond Guantanamo, a Web of Prisons for Terrorism Inmates.” 
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B. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 
REHABILITATION 
The CDCR, with approximately 131,000 prisoners and an annual budget of $9.1 
billion (2013–2014), houses only the most violent and serious offenders in the state.87 
Their 33 prisons are spread throughout California, with over 900 miles separating Pelican 
Bay and Centinela Prisons. A significant number of opportunities exist for radicalization 
efforts to occur within the prisons. Challenges faced by the CDCR are the minimal and 
inconsistent vetting of volunteers (including religious services providers) who have 
access to the prisoners, worship services being led by radical prisoners, and staffing 
levels that do not allow for the effective monitoring of prisoner activities. 
A number of conditions are present in the CDCR that provide a ripe environment 
for radicalization. In 2005 and 2006, the FBI conducted a survey of approximately 2,000 
prisons in the United States. The result was a determination that the following 
circumstances support radicalization. 
• Most cases of prisoner radicalization appear to be originated by domestic 
extremists with few or no foreign connections 
• Some radicalized Islamic inmates are current or former members of street 
or prison gangs, indicating an emerging “crossover” from gang members 
to Islamic extremists 
• Radicalization activity levels appear to be higher in densely populated 
areas on the West Coast and in the northeastern United States.  
• After data from the survey were fully analyzed, the FBI added one more 
condition: charismatic leadership may be the single most important 
contributing factor to prisoner radicalization.88 
1. Levels of Classification and Housing 
Eight prisons in California are designated reception centers, where prisoners are 
first sent for orientation, an introduction to available programs, and for determining their 
87 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, The Year in Accomplishments: 2013, ed. 
Office of Public & Employee Communications (Sacramento, CA: California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation, 2013). 
88 Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat, 52. 
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level of classification.89 Classification is based on criminal history, gang/disruptive group 
affiliation, disciplinary history while incarcerated, escapes history, length/type of 
sentence, etc.90 While their classification may change during their incarceration (with a 
few exceptions), they are initially sent to an appropriate facility for their original 
classification. 
The CDCR operates four levels of facilities: 
Level I: Facilities and camps consist primarily of open dormitories with a 
low security perimeter. Level II: Facilities consist primarily of open 
dormitories with a secure perimeter, which may include armed coverage. 
Level III: Facilities primarily have a secure perimeter with armed 
coverage and housing units with cells adjacent to exterior walls. Level IV: 
Facilities have a secure perimeter with internal and external armed 
coverage and housing units or cellblock housing with cells non-adjacent to 
exterior walls.91 
Condemned prisoners and those sentenced to life without the possibility of parole 
are automatically sent to a Level IV institution. Four of the Level IV prisons also have a 
SHU.92 The CDCR’s policy states, “Inmates whose conduct endangers the safety of 
others or the security of the institution are housed in SHU. In most cases, these inmates 
have committed serious rule violations while housed in a general population setting.”93 
Membership or affiliation with a street or prison gang is one criteria used when 
determining the appropriate level of housing for prisoners. Validation of 
membership/affiliation must follow specific guidelines and be documented on 
appropriate forms. Criteria for gang identification includes self-admission, tattoos, 
written material, photos, staff information, and information from other agencies.94 This 
89 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Operations Manual (Sacramento, CA: 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2014), 527. 
90 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Classification Score Sheet (Sacramento, 
CA: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2002). 
91 “Entering a California State Prison—What to Expect,” accessed August 12, 2014, http://www.cdcr. 
ca.gov/ombuds/entering_a_prison_faqs.html.  
92 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, The Year in Accomplishments: 2013, 19. 
93 “California State Prison, Corcoran (CSP-COR),” 2013, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/facilities_locator/ 
cor-institution_details-shu.html.  
94 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Operations Manual, 538. 
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determination can be made during the initial reception center process or at any time 
during their incarceration if new information becomes available. At the time of initial 
classification, prisoners are informed that involvement with gang activity may result in 
segregated housing.95 
2. Religious Services and Literature 
Confinement in prison does not remove a prisoner’s freedom to exercise the 
religion of their choice. The warden at each facility is responsible for ensuring that 
reasonable efforts are made to provide religious programs at their institution.96 Each 
facility utilizes the services of staff chaplains (a generic reference to all religious service 
providers except the Native American Spiritual Leaders), whose duties include 
conducting worship, administering sacraments, counseling, and providing religious 
education.  
Unfortunately, staffing levels do not provide for consistent programs across all 
denominations. In 2007, there was “one chaplain for every two thousand inmates at 
Folsom Prison.”97 To help bridge the gap, wardens may also use the services of part-time 
chaplains, volunteer chaplains, and prisoners.98 The vetting of chaplains, whether 
employees or volunteers, falls to the community resource manager (CRM) at each facility 
(except San Quintin, where the program is set up differently). Their approval process 
consists of a criminal history records check and nothing else. No standardized process or 
sharing of information between facilities exists, which results in 33 different policies at 
33 different prisons.99 Unfortunately, because of this lack of coordination, a chaplain 
banned at one facility can be hired and/or volunteer at another facility.100 CDCR’s 
95 Ibid., 527. 
96 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Operations Manual, 830. 
97 Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat, 151. 
98 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Operations Manual, 830. 
99 A special thank you to Community Resources Manager David Skaggs, Office of Policy 
Standardization (CDCR), for helping the researcher understand the duties of the facility CRMs and the 
challenges they face with all religious programs. 
100 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization: Are 
Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?, 7. 
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security chief believed that the complete lack of “intelligence capabilities across 
institutional lines” allows such information-sharing gaps to occur.101 Referencing this 
problem, Mark S. Hamm noted that, “21st-century ideology was being fought with 20th-
century technology.”102  
Inadequate vetting of chaplains allows radical ideologies to be preached to the 
prisoners. A former head chaplain at Folsom Prison stated, “the Nation of Islam is the 
biggest problem. They pressure inmates to convert. Their preachers encourage inmates to 
overthrow the government.”103 Another chaplain stated, “We are called on by the 
administration to monitor Muslim preachers who come into the prison. The problem is 
that many of these volunteers go over our heads to get credentials. We are left out of the 
loop when it comes to selecting and approving volunteers.”104 
To compound this problem, the lack of chaplains available to assist with Muslim 
services often means the duties will fall to the prisoners. One survey of state prison 
wardens across the country revealed that half allowed prisoners to conduct the religious 
services.105 According to Frank Cilluffo, “Radical prisoners who volunteer for religious 
functions and assume religious authority benefit from a captive audience which may, in 
large part, have had no prior exposure to Islam, and no way to put the radical message 
into context.”106 In some instances, radical prisoners have intimidated qualified chaplains 
into relinquishing their roles, so that the prisoners can spread their radical beliefs. 
Staffing levels at the prison facilities do not allow for effective monitoring of the 
activities that occur during religious services. However, these prisoners are quite adept at 
avoiding unwanted attention by staff. They are usually “model prisoners” who do not 
appear to warrant additional attention. On one occasion, a gang intelligence officer 
101 Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat, 139. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat, 153. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization: Are 
Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?, 7. 
106 Ibid. 
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entered the room at Folsom Prison where Kevin James and his JIS companions were 
allegedly worshiping but they were found to be practicing martial arts. The state chaplain 
(imam) was present and was allowing this rather sharp deviation from religious practice 
to occur.107 
While conducting this research, the researcher discovered that the topic of The 
Noble Quran was a sensitive one with CDCR personnel. Contraband is described in 
sections 3006, 3145, and 3146 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. The 
Noble Quran apparently was not found to meet the threshold of those sections, as it does 
not appear on the CDCRs centralized list of disapproved publications.108 
3. Monitoring and Reporting 
Prisoners, gang members, and terrorists often use “letters, numbers, symbols, and 
even invisible ink to encode messages in an attempt to hide illegal activity.”109 When 
written correspondence is known to contain or suspected of containing hidden messages, 
CDCR personnel seek assistance from the FBI’s Cryptanalysis and Racketeering Records 
Unit (CRRU), “Code Breakers.” Communications intentionally designed to discourage or 
prevent undesired readers from obtaining the contents are likely to contain information of 
value. For that reason, it is imperative that law enforcement establishes practices that 
provide for the monitoring of such communication.  
In 1971, the CDCR’s special services unit (SSU) joined efforts with eight other 
criminal justice agencies and departments to create the state Prison Gang Task Force 
(PGTF). In later years, the name was changed to the California Gang Task Force, as their 
work was not limited to prison gangs. This group is comprised of local, state, out of state, 
and federal agencies who share gang related intelligence. They meet monthly and the 
coordinator is responsible for creating and disseminating a monthly report of gang 
107 Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat, 133. 
108 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Centralized List of Disapproved 
Publications, ed. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Sacramento, CA: California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2014). 
109 “Part 1: Breaking Codes to Stop Crime,” March 21, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/ 
march/cryptanalysis_032111.  
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activity. They continue to share information throughout the state and across the various 
jurisdictions. 
In an effort to combat prison-based gangs and to assess the influence they have on 
street gangs, the FBI created the California Gang Intelligence Initiative (CGII). It is a 
joint effort between the FBI’s Safe Streets Initiative, the CDCR, and the FBI’s National 
Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC). Staffed by analysts and agents from state and federal 
agencies, and housed in an FBI facility, the CGII “detects, deters, and disrupts efforts by 
the gangs’ leadership and facilitators to extend their reach from within prisons to 
communities in California and beyond.”110 Several of the staff assigned to CGII have 
developed an expertise in prison radicalization, and they provide training to CDCR and 
other law enforcement throughout the state. 
CDCR administrators have found that the techniques used to monitor and report 
gang activity were sufficient to employ with radicalization efforts as well. Investigative 
staff assigned to CDCR facilities have been trained to recognize and monitor 
radicalization efforts, with help from the FBI. They report suspected prison radicalization 
intelligence to the CGII, where analysts can de-conflict and compare the information 
against other known persons and activities.  
Frank Cilluffo, Director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute, testified, 
“officials at the state level have demonstrated an impressive level of resolve and 
commitment to countering prisoner radicalization. The issue has been identified as a 
priority, and a concerted investigative effort is underway in California.”111 However, he 
also stated, “prisoners with extremist religious views often conduct themselves as model 
prisoners, hence, wardens (and other prison staff) who are already overburdened may 
have little incentive to focus on these inmates.”112 Therefore, even given the long history 
110 Beyond the Streets: America’s Evolving Gang Threat, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 112th 
Cong., 2nd sess., (2012). 
111 David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law 
Enforcement Agencies (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 2009), 5. 
112 Ibid. 
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of addressing gang issues within CDCR, it is possible that many radicalization efforts are 
not being recognized. 
The investigative experience of the gang investigators is paying dividends though. 
In one example, gang investigators assigned to the Pelican Bay State Prison discovered a 
plan by prisoners to align themselves with Islamic education centers throughout the 
nation. The prisoners were “learning Arabic and using Muslim edicts received through 
the mail to facilitate criminal objectives while in prison.”113 
Information deemed to be valuable and/or actionable is shared with the local 
intelligence fusion center.114 The United States currently has 78 fusion centers,115 six of 
which are located in California (more than any other state). Many state and local entities 
established intelligence fusion centers after the events on September 11, 2001. They are 
primarily staffed with state and local authorities, but most, if not all, have FBI and DHS-
embedded personnel. According to the DHS, “fusion centers were uniquely positioned to 
identify and detect crimes or threats that may have a national security or homeland 
security implication. Fusion centers have since evolved to play a unique role in protecting 
their communities, informing decision making, and enhancing information-sharing 
activities among law enforcement and homeland security partners.”116 
California initially had four fusion centers (also known as threat assessment 
centers) that aligned with the federal districts. They are the AOR for both the FBI and 
Attorney General. In 2007, authorities in Orange County established its own center 
(ostensibly to support critical infrastructure and threat information related to Disneyland) 
and several years later, the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and the state Office of 
Emergency Services (OES) created the State Threat Assessment Center (STAC). 
Together these entities form the State Threat Assessment System (STAS). Efforts are 
currently underway to establish connectivity between all six California fusion centers. 
113 Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of 
Non-Traditional Faith Groups Final Report, 40. 
114 Ballas, Prisoner Radicalization. 
115 “Fusion Centers,” accessed November 6, 2014, https://nfcausa.org/default.aspx/MenuItemID/117/ 
MenuGroup/Public+Home.htm.  
116 “Fusion Center Success Stories,” July 24, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-success-stories.  
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The fusion centers have the staff, knowledge, training, experience, and access to 
the databases necessary to vet appropriately radicalization intelligence received from 
prison, jail, or CGII personnel. If appropriate, they can submit information to the FBI’s 
eGuardian system. eGuardian was developed by the FBI to share terrorism related 
activity. An entry in eGuardian ensures that the information is immediately shared with 
the local JJTF.117 
Frank Cilluffo, Director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute, testified 
“officials at the state level have demonstrated an impressive level of resolve and 
commitment to countering prisoner radicalization. The issue has been identified as a 
priority, and a concerted investigative effort is underway in California.”118 
C. SUMMARY 
While a number of differences exist between these two prison systems, they do 
share some common elements. Both systems are responsible for housing prisoners for 
lengthy sentences, they face similar challenges regarding appropriate leadership for 
religious services, and both have previously documented incidents of radicalization. They 
both have policies that prohibit prisoners from leading religious services, yet they both 
allow it to occur because of a lack of qualified, properly vetted providers. Training 
related to radicalization is provided to staff in both systems, but to a larger audience 
within the BOP. Both systems have reporting mechanisms in place that appear to be 
working well when properly used. However, CDCR’s programs appear to be quite robust 
in the gang activity area, possibly to the extent that radicalization efforts may not be 
captured. In summary, both systems have policies, practices, and procedures in place that 
may be appropriate for implementation at the county jail level.  
 
117 “Stats & Services: eGuardian,” accessed August 20, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/ 
eguardian.  
118 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies, 5. 
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III. MONITORING EFFORTS IN THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
JAILS 
Jail populations in California have reached an all-time high as a result of the 
Public Safety Realignment Act. In the first quarter of 2014, the average daily population 
reached 82,527. This number represents a 16 percent increase over the population in 2011 
(71,088), prior to realignment.119 Overcrowded conditions in jails and prisons are often 
cited as the cause of many problems, including assaults, inadequate staffing levels, and 
most troubling for the topic of this research, a sense of frustration for the inmates. A 
report in the United Kingdom (UK) stated, “Over-crowding and under-staffing amplify 
the conditions that lend themselves to radicalisation (sic).”120 Compounding the 
overcrowding problem, jail administrators were left with no choice but to release the 
lower-level, less sophisticated inmates who had been sentenced to less time to make room 
for those felons who previously would have gone to prison. As a result, the face of the 
inmate population changed. Eighty-eight (88) percent of the statewide jail population was 
now felons, compared to 80 percent before realignment, a 10-percent increase.121  
The LASD operates the largest jail system in the United States, and not 
surprisingly, it was severely affected by realignment. The average daily population 
throughout their eight facilities was approximately 18,610 in the first quarter of 2014.122 
This number marks a 27-percent increase over the 2011 population, and approximately 
4,300 inmates over the designed capacity.123 Almost 3,000 sworn personnel staffed the 
LASD jails in January 2013.124  
119 “Jail Profile Survey,” accessed October 8, 2014, http://www.bscc.ca.gov/s_fsojailprofilesurvey. 
php.  
120 Peter R. Neumann, Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation in 15 Countries 
(London, England: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, King’s 
College London, 2010). 
121 “Jail Profile Survey.” 
122 Ibid. 
123 Thompson, “AP Exclusive: Jails House 1,100 Long-Term Inmates.” 
124 Los Angeles County Civil Grand Jury, 2012–2013 Civil Grand Jury: Final Report, 4. 
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The extremely diverse population of Los Angeles County is also reflected in the 
jail population. As such, many of the problems that law enforcement encounter on the 
streets present themselves in the jails as well. Racial tension, gang violence, sexual 
assaults, and dislike for law enforcement are commonplace in both environments. To 
prevent and/or mitigate some of these issues, inmates are housed in locations and 
conditions best suited for their level of classification. 
A. LEVELS OF CLASSIFICATION AND HOUSING 
County jails in California are classified by type as follows. 
• Type I: Typically in a police station, designed to hold inmates no longer 
than 96 hours. 
• Type II: Designed to hold persons pending arraignment, during trial, and 
upon a sentence of commitment. 
• Type III: A detention facility for the detention of convicted and sentenced 
persons.  
• Type IV: A facility used to house those inmates participating in work 
release/furlough type programs. 
The LASD operates three type II facilities, one of which houses women. They 
have six type III facilities, five of which are currently operational (one is closed for 
budget reasons). Four of these facilities are at the Pitchess Ranch and hold a combined 
total of 10,000 inmates, and the other is the “Twin Towers,” with a capacity of 4,363125 
(the world’s largest jail). Inmates are assigned a classification level (1 through 9) upon 
intake at the facility. They are then evaluated to determine whether any sub-group 
classification would apply. This secondary classification may include the need for access 
to mental health providers, members of rival street or prison gangs, etc. 
125 Vanir Construction Management Inc., Los Angeles County Jail Plan: Independent Review and 
Comprehensive Report (Los Angeles, CA: Vanir Construction Management, Inc., 2014), 7. 
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B. RELIGIOUS SERVICES 
In California, the minimum standards for local detention facilities are contained in 
Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. The only standards related to religious 
practices are within section 1072, which state: 
The facility administrator of a Type I, II, III or IV facility shall develop 
written policies and procedures to provide opportunities for inmates to 
participate in religious services, practices and counseling on a voluntary 
basis.  
The LASD’s religious and volunteer services unit administers the jail chaplaincy 
program. The chaplaincy program has almost 300 ordained or licensed chaplains, and 
approximately 1,500 volunteers who assist with spiritual counseling, scripture study, 
death notifications, and worship services. They also assist with special events, like 
Christmas, Passover, and Ramadan.126 
After several years of complaints by the ACLU, the Sheriff’s Department has 
recently made significant improvements regarding the treatment of Muslim inmates. 
Previously, other faiths were allowed to congregate regularly, but the Muslim services 
were only allowed occasionally. Muslim inmates wishing to congregate for Jumu’ah, a 
prayer Muslims hold each Friday afternoon, were denied permission because of a lack of 
volunteer imams to lead them. The Sheriff’s Department conceded in April 2014 and 
allows inmates to lead the prayers, under the supervision of a staff member or chaplain 
from another denomination.127  
For a number of years, Muslim inmates complained that they were not afforded 
the opportunity to pray according to the schedule their faith requires. Followers of Islam 
are required to pray five times throughout the day.  
1. Morning Prayer (Fajr) may be offered from break-of-dawn until just 
before sunrise. 
126 “Religious and Volunteer Services Unit,” accessed August 31, 2014, http://shq.lasdnews.net/pages/ 
PageDetail.aspx?id=754.  
127 Cindy Chang, “Under New Rules, Muslim Inmates in L.A. County Jails Observe Ramadan,” Los 
Angeles Times, July 26, 2014. 
 35 
                                                 
2. Noon Prayer (Zuhr) may be offered from just after midday until 
afternoon. 
3. Afternoon Prayer (‘Asr) may be offered from late afternoon until just 
before sunset. 
4. Sunset Prayer (Maghrib) may be offered from sunset until darkness. 
5. Night Prayer (Isha) may be offered throughout the night hours.128 
Additionally, of greater importance to the followers of Islam is the ability to 
participate in Jum’ah prayer on Friday afternoon (usually in place of the noon prayer). A 
shortage of imams resulted in the cancellation of many prayer sessions, including the 
Jum’ah. In April 2014, the jail administrators directed that all inmates be afforded the 
opportunity to practice their faith according to tradition.129 Muslim inmates are now 
allowed to lead the worship services with custody staff supervision.130 When logistics 
prevent them from gathering in the chapels to pray, they are able to do so in their cells 
with mats provided by the chaplains. Traditional mats used in the chapel are stored in the 
chaplaincy office, and inmates have been provided foldable pocket prayer mats for use in 
their housing areas (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3.  Prayer Mats131 
128 Council on American-Islamic Relations, A Correctional Institution’s Guide to Islamic Religious 
Practices (Washington, DC: Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2005). 
129 Chang, “Under New Rules, Muslim Inmates in L.A. County Jails Observe Ramadan.” 
130 Since this directive was issued, inmates have only led the service a few times. Appropriately vetted 
volunteer imams have been available all other times. 
131 “Islamic Travel Prayer Mat with Pocket Sized Carry Bag,” accessed October 7, 2014, http://www. 
zaffronshop.com/Travel-Prayer-Mat-with-Pocket-Sized-Carry-Bag-p/r5.htm.  
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No open source information was discovered that addressed the permissibility of 
The Noble Quran in the Los Angeles County jails. 
C. MONITORING AND REPORTING 
Many of the programs in place to monitor and report gang related activity could 
be easily applied to radicalization efforts as well. According to Ian M. Cuthbertson, 
“American authorities already have considerable experience combating criminal gangs 
within prisons, and some of the lessons they have learned are readily applicable to the 
problems presented by terrorist networks within prisons.”132 In an effort to prevent gang 
problems in their facilities, and to assist federal, state and other local agencies with their 
efforts by sharing valuable information, the LASD has had a number of programs in 
place for many years. 
1. Operation Safe Jails 
In 1985, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department established the Operation 
Safe Jails (OSJ). Their mission was described as: 
The primary role of OSJ is gang intelligence gathering with the objective 
of preventing facility violence between rival gangs, inmates of different 
races, and the influence of prison gangs on our inmate population. OSJ 
provides facility and division executives with updated information 
regarding ongoing trends which affect day-to-day operations of the 
facilities, thereby allowing executives to make informed decision. OSJ is 
recognized as a leader in providing gang intelligence to the law 
enforcement community.133 
While their primary duty is related to gang intelligence, they regularly assist other 
local, state, and federal agencies with investigations. Members of OSJ monitor inmate 
communications, develop informants, and conduct cell searches. These efforts result in 
valuable intelligence that is shared with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s 
Operation Safe Streets (OSS).134 To facilitate effective communications with other 
132 Cuthbertson, “Prisons and the Education of Terrorists,” 20. 
133 Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Year in Review: Custody Investigative Services Unit 
(CISU) (Los Angeles: Custody Operations Division, 2008). 
134 Barsh, “Creation of a Homeland Security Jail Information Model,” 11. 
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partner agencies, a sergeant from the OSJ regularly meets with staff from the Los 
Angeles area JTTF, the CDCR Gang Task Force, and the Joint Regional Intelligence 
Center (JRIC).135  
In 2008, a Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU) was created to facilitate more effective 
communication between CDCR and the Custody Investigative Services Unit (CISU). The 
CISU was the new unit that encompassed OSJ, GIU, the Jail Investigations Unit (JIU) 
and the Custody K-9 detail. The GIU provides liaison with LASD detectives, CDCR 
personnel, and federal partners.136 
2. Terrorism Liaison Officers 
In 1995, OSJ deputies began attending TLO training. The JRIC describes TLOs 
on their website: 
A terrorism liaison officer (TLO) is an individual who serves as the point 
of contact for a public safety agency in matters related to terrorism 
information and intelligence. A TLO, though not necessarily an expert in 
terrorism, attends meetings and receives terrorism training, information, 
and intelligence from the local fusion center, online resources, and other 
entities engaged in homeland security initiatives. The TLO then educates 
others within his or her agency, thereby enhancing situational awareness, 
early warning, and operational readiness.137  
TLOs receive specialized training in early identification of threats, signs of terrorism, 
radicalization, and information collection and processing. They also receive training in 
proper reporting methods, which includes the use of the SAR system.138 SARs are 
submitted to their local terrorism fusion center (JRIC in the case of the Los Angeles 
County jails). 
135 Larry A. Mead, Homegrown Terrorism: Investigative Project, in Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, DC: 
2007), 3. 
136 Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Year in Review: Custody Investigative Services Unit 
(CISU). 
137 “Why Become a TLO,” accessed August 8, 2014, https://www.jric.org/default.aspx/MenuItemID/ 
284/MenuGroup/Home.htm.  
138 “Terror Liaison Officer Training,” accessed August 8, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2013/january/terror-liaison-officer-training.  
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3. Jail Interview Team 
The duties of the OSJ deputies since 9/11 include monitoring the inmate 
population for signs of radicalization.139 In 2009, then-Sergeant Jennifer Barsh was 
newly assigned to the Men’s central jail. She had recently worked as a case analyst at the 
JRIC, had served on the Los Angeles area JTTF, and had been a TLO for many years. 
She recognized the void that existed with regards to homeland security intelligence 
collection and dissemination.140 Sergeant Barsh and two deputies created a JIT. 
The JIT functions as an ancillary duty to the deputy’s full time assignment. 
Members of the team are selected based on interest, military experience, language skills, 
and homeland security expertise. They are all trained as TLOs and received additional 
training created specifically for the JIT. They tour the JRIC, meet the staff, and learn how 
to submit the most valuable SARs. Policies were established that provide for the timely 
dissemination of critical information.  
D. SUMMARY 
A review of the open source information related to efforts in the Los Angeles 
County jails indicates that a number of programs are in place that addresses radicalization 
issues. The programs established to collect and disseminate gang intelligence, combined 
with the newer JIT, work together to ensure that radicalization efforts are reported to the 
appropriate entities in a timely manner. Many of the staff assigned to these jails have 
received training in prison radicalization, and a significant amount of networking occurs 
between jail staff and outside entities tasked with monitoring radicalization. The Los 
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department has paved the path for other jail staff, in California 
and beyond, who seek to develop programs to ensure that they effectively monitor and 
report radicalization efforts in their facility. 
139 Barsh, “Creation of a Homeland Security Jail Information Model,” 23. 
140 Ibid., 34. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF KEY ISSUES 
This thesis frames and initiates discourse about monitoring and reporting 
radicalization activities in jail facilities where no programs currently exist. Relevant data 
was examined, including programs, policies, and procedures in three correctional systems 
in which radicalization efforts have been monitored and reported for a number of years—
the federal BOP, the CDCR, and the Los Angeles County jails. While dissenting opinions 
were found, an overwhelming majority of the material reviewed supported the following. 
• Radicalization does occur in the United States 
• Those who radicalize can pose a threat to the U.S. homeland141 
• Radicalization occurs (among other places) in prisons 
• The prison systems examined have effective programs in place 
• A change in California law in 2011 directed that thousands of convicted 
persons serve their lengthy sentences in county jails instead of a state 
prison 
• A greater likelihood of radicalization in county jails now exists. 
• Many county jails are not prepared to address the issue of radicalization 
• This intelligence-sharing gap may result in danger to jail staff and/or 
valuable homeland security intelligence not being received by the 
appropriate entity. 
Of utmost importance to a jail administrator is ensuring the safety of the staff, 
inmates, and visitors. To this end, policies must be established that focus on safety and 
security. Other programs and goals fall in line behind that. The Jail Information Model 
recommended by the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office “encourages 
and promotes a paradigm shift from traditional corrections activities to proactive public 
safety capabilities. This shift helps to solve current crimes, prevent future crimes or 
reduce their impact, save lives and property in the jail and the community, and improve 
141 Frank Cilluffo, in his well-known and often-cited, “Out of the Shadows: Getting Head of Prisoner 
Radicalization,” wrote “America faces what could be an enormous challenge – every radicalized prisoner 
becomes a potential terrorist recruit.” 
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community quality of life.”142 It continues to state, “Information developed in holding 
cells, workout areas, recreation yards, and in dorms can save lives both inside the facility 
(inmates and corrections officers) and outside by preventing crimes or stopping a 
planned terrorist attack.”143 (Emphasis added) Formal information gathering and 
reporting processes can mitigate security vulnerabilities in the facility, minimize threats 
to staff and inmates, and prevent threats to this nation’s communities outside of the 
facility. 
A. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This research was intentionally conducted using open source material, which 
resulted in the unrestricted distribution designation for the final product. While the use of 
restricted sources like Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) or For Official Use Only 
(FOUO) would have provided a better picture of the threat, and allowed for a more 
detailed description and analysis of the systems used for reporting, the limited 
accessibility of a “restricted distribution” thesis diminishes its usefulness. As a result, this 
research is available to a wider audience, but is somewhat limited in scope. Practitioners 
working in custodial environments should have access to LES and FOUO resources that 
discuss radicalization, investigative techniques, etc. by virtue of their employment. 
It was also discovered, not surprisingly, that some policies governing procedures 
at county jails are undefined, non-existent, or not available through open sources. The 
Operations Order that guides the Intelligence Units at Sacramento County’s two jails 
lacks specific details describing procedures (see Appendix B). It is not available online, 
but it was available to the researcher in his official capacity. Similarly, policies governing 
the Los Angeles County jails were not available through open sources, but LASD staff 
did share any policies requested for this research. They were aware that the request was 
for scholastic research, as opposed to official use, so their transparency is likely the norm. 
142 John Matthews, Jail Information Model, ed. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2006), v. 
143 Ibid., 2. 
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These policies are also available to anyone who submits a California Public Records Act 
request.  
Both prison systems examined for this research were found to be more cognizant 
of their obligation for transparency. The CDCR’s 857-page Operations Manual is 
available to anyone online,144 as are many of the policies that direct the BOP’s 
operations.145 This manual contains few references to the monitoring and reporting of 
activities related to gangs, radicalization, or other disruptive groups. A search of open 
source material did reveal a handful of news reports about the BOP operations, and more 
specifically, the highly secretive CMUs, based on information gleaned from 
congressional testimony and former prisoners. 
B. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE THREE MODELS 
The practices of three penal systems were reviewed through an AI lens, in an 
attempt to locate the smartest practices. By looking for smart practices, and asking 
positive questions, the solutions most likely to be considered rose to the forefront.  
1. Smart Practices of the Federal Bureau of Prisons  
The federal BOP is unique in this area in that it houses known terrorists who have 
been convicted of terrorist related activity. If left to their own devices, these prisoners 
would be free to spread their message of hate, violence, and radicalization, or worse, 
direct terrorist activities from inside the prison walls. BOP staff must monitor the 
activities of these prisoners, report suspicious incidents to the appropriate agencies, and 
take necessary measures to prevent nefarious activities.  
The BOP’s efforts at preventing radicalization focus on the following. 
• Managing and monitoring inmates who could attempt to radicalize other 
inmates 
144 “Adults Institutions, Programs and Parole Regulations, Department Operations Manual (DOM),” 
accessed October 20, 2014, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Regulations/Adult_Operations/DOM_TOC.html. 
145 “BOP Policies,” accessed October 20, 2014, http://www.bop.gov/PublicInfo/execute/policy 
search?todo=query. 
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• Screening religious service providers to avoid hiring or contracting with 
anyone who could radicalize inmates 
• Providing programs to help inmates become less vulnerable to attempts at 
radicalization146 
To accomplish their stated goals, BOP officials have established a number of 
solid practices. They train their staff to assist with recognizing signs of radicalization, 
including annual awareness training. They have two employees assigned to the National 
Joint Terrorism Task Force, who manage the CII. The CII ensures that “intelligence 
regarding any attempts by inmates, religious providers, or others to radicalize any 
segment of the population is gathered and shared, and interdiction action is taken by the 
appropriate correctional authority.”147 Moreover, the most extreme example of 
monitoring the activity of prisoners among the three systems occurs in the BOP’s CMUs, 
where staff in their counterterrorism unit monitors every move and every noise remotely.  
BOP administrators also recognize that religious service providers can, and do, 
influence the beliefs and behaviors of prisoners. In 2004, the Office of the Inspector 
General commissioned a report titled, “A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of 
Muslim Religious Services Providers.” The report addressed many radicalization issues 
and concluded with 16 recommendations, which the BOP appears to have embraced.148 
As a result, they have sound practices in place to ensure that people outside the prison 
walls who seek to encourage radicalization are prevented from accessing the facility. Due 
to their adherence to these procedures, they have not yet had to dismiss a Muslim 
chaplain for behavior inconsistent with their desired goals. 
146 Department of Homeland Security, Radicalization, Information Sharing and Community Outreach: 
Protecting the Homeland from Homegrown Terror (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2007), 1. 
147 Ibid., 2. 
148 U.S. Department of Justice, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim 
Religious Service Providers (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2009), 50–55. 
 44 
                                                 
2. Smart Practices of the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation 
The CDCR has long been a leader among state prisons in the management of gang 
members and their associates. In October 2013, approximately 2,200 validated gang 
members were in CDCR facilities,149 and robust monitoring and reporting systems 
ensured that critical information was shared with appropriate entities in a timely manner. 
To ensure proper activity reporting (outside of their internal systems), the CDCR has 
embedded personnel at the FBI-led CGII, where personnel analyze the information 
submitted by prison staff. This information deemed to be actionable and/or to contain an 
imminent threat can be entered into eGuardian, the FBI’s sensitive but unclassified 
information-sharing platform.150 This measure ensures that personnel from the 
appropriate entities receive the information almost immediately. 
Operations in place to monitor and report gang related information can also be 
used for radicalization issues, Frank Cilluffo testified: 
Fortunately, we are not building entirely from scratch: lessons can and 
should be learned and adapted from present and past efforts to combat 
gangs and right-wing extremists in prisons. Existing prison programs 
designed to prevent radicalization and recruitment or to disrupt radical 
groups–whether at the local, state, federal, or international level–should be 
evaluated to determine a set of best practices that can be used to develop a 
comprehensive strategy to counter radicalization. Knowledge must be 
translated into action across the board. Awareness, education, and training 
programs must be developed for personnel who work in prison, probation, 
and parole settings.151 
One aspect of their operation that needs improvement is the lack of a centralized 
vetting and record management system for the numerous volunteers, including the 
religious service providers, who have contact with the prisoners. As mentioned in 
Chapter II, a volunteer who is banned from one CDCR facility can volunteer at another 
one in the same system. “More than 15,000 volunteers work in CDCR institutions; some 
149 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Cdcr Fact Sheet–Security Housing Units 
(Sacramento, CA: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2013), 1. 
150 “Stats & Services: eGuardian.” 
151 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization: Are 
Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?, 9. 
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90 percent of them in religious programming. Together, Folsom and New Folsom have 
about 100 religious volunteers who are vetted not by chaplains but by intelligence 
officers,” wrote Mark S. Hamm in his report on terrorism recruitment in prisons.152 
Information related to the training that personnel receive on radicalization and 
similar topics was not available. However, no information was found to suggest that a 
significant number of CDCR employees have been trained as TLOs. The CCIC offers 
many of these courses for employees in their AOR, which encompasses the 34 counties 
in the federal Eastern District of California. That AOR is comprised of eight federal 
prisons, 22 state prisons, and nearly 50 county jails. Given the number of correctional 
officers and deputy sheriffs that staff these 70 or so facilities, a relatively small number 
have taken advantage of this training. 
3. Smart Practices of the Los Angeles County Jail System 
The COPS office’s Jail Information Model training manual states, “only a small 
percentage of local jails have a formal information collection and distribution system.”153 
The United States has approximately 3,200 county jails, many of which are so small they 
would have no reason to establish a formal intelligence program.154 In contrast, the Los 
Angeles County jail system is the largest in the nation and has had programs in place for 
many years designed to monitor, report, and disrupt groups that pose a threat.  
LASD staff found that the methods they used to report gang related activity were 
also appropriate for use in reporting radicalization efforts. The missing piece was the 
ability of staff to recognize the signs of radicalization. This gap was addressed with the 
creation of the JIT, members of which received training as TLOs and in recognizing 
radicalization. Additional staff not assigned to the JIT received some of that training as 
well. 
152 Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of 
Non-Traditional Faith Groups Final Report, 97. 
153 Matthews, Jail Information Model, 3. 
154 “Statistics of Note: Just How Many,” accessed October 8, 2014, https://members.aja.org/ 
About/StatisticsOfNote.aspx.  
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C. HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS IN EACH SYSTEM 
The following hypothetical situations show the potential disruptions, or lack 
thereof, of radicalization efforts in the various penal institutions.155 The fourth example 
represents a likely potential situation in many jails in California. 
1. Hypothetical #1—Bureau of Prisons 
The FBI arrested John Green for a bank robbery in Los Angeles, California. He 
pled no contest and was sentenced to eight years in federal prison. He was sent to the 
Memphis FCI (Federal Correctional Institute), a medium security facility. He knew that 
his family would not be able to visit very often, if at all. They could not afford airfare and 
did not have a vehicle reliable enough to drive that distance. Green was very unhappy 
with the “system” that had once again taken him away from his family and robbed him of 
his freedom. He arrived very unhappy with the U.S. government. 
He was in federal prison for the first time, and he found himself surrounded by 
prisoners who shared his same anti-government thoughts. Several befriended him soon 
after his arrival, and he became comfortable, knowing there was security in numbers. 
Soon, these new friends shared their thoughts about their Muslim faith with him, and 
provided him with some literature. He found it all very appealing, and soon he was 
attending worship services with them. A local volunteer imam, who had cleared a 
background investigation, led the services that were monitored by prison staff.  
Fortunately, processes were in place to prevent this situation from escalating. 
Staff had received training on “radicalization awareness,” and recognized that Green was 
being recruited. The “friends” were identified as major influencers in the radicalization 
movement, and were quickly relocated to other areas of the prison or to different prisons 
entirely. Green’s communications were monitored, and any items of interest were shared 
with the FBI through the CII liaisons.  
155 Many recent incidents exemplify the importance of recognizing and reporting radicalization, but 
they cannot be disclosed in this unrestricted document. 
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2. Hypothetical #2—California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation 
Benjamin Smith was convicted of robbery in Los Angeles County and was 
sentenced to eight years in state prison. After spending several weeks in a reception 
center to determine his appropriate classification, he was sent to the Deuell Vocational 
Institute (DVI) in Tracy, California. Since it is approximately 300 miles away from his 
home, his family is able to visit him occasionally. 
Like John Green, Smith disliked and distrusted the government. He also found 
companionship in fellow prisoners who shared his thoughts. He had no religious 
background, but found comfort in the messages being preached by his new friends. He 
began attending worship services, led by a volunteer imam (Mohammed Hamzah Khan). 
Khan had been banned from leading religious services at Folsom State Prison, after the 
investigative personnel discovered that he was providing copies of The Noble Quran to 
the prisoners. While the book is not banned in the CDCR, policy prohibits volunteers 
from providing any items to prisoners without prior approval. Since the CDCR lacks a 
centralized system to track banned visitors, DVI officials were unaware of Khan’s radical 
ideology and his policy violation history. Due to staff shortages, the worship services 
occurred with no monitoring by prison personnel. 
Smith began the legal process to change his name to Akba Jihad Jordan. Line staff 
in Smith’s housing unit had not received any training in radicalization, and therefore, did 
not recognize any of the signs that he was being recruited. However, personnel in the 
investigative services unit conduct random inspections of incoming and outgoing written 
correspondence, and they discovered that he was communicating with subjects known to 
have ties to radical organizations. They began monitoring all his communications, and 
shared the information with analysts at the CGII. Smith was moved to a different housing 
unit in an attempt to disrupt the radicalization process.  
3. Hypothetical #3—Los Angeles County Jail System 
Michael Forrest was arrested in Los Angeles for selling rock cocaine and received 
an eight-year sentence. Due to AB109, he was sent to a Los Angeles County jail instead 
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of the CDCR. Since many of the employees had been trained in radicalization, terrorism, 
and gang recognition, he was watched more closely than he would have been in the 
CDCR.  
A significant number of employees in the jail had been trained as TLOs, so they 
knew what to look for and what to report. A routine cell search, conducted for security 
purposes, resulted in the discovery of documents that appeared to indicate Forrest’s 
support for the recent activities of ISIS. This material was shown to deputies from the 
JIT, who submitted a SAR to the JRIC. JRIC personnel entered the information into 
eGuardian, where it contributed to a current JTTF investigation. Forrest was interviewed 
by FBI agents and moved to a different housing location. Jail personnel continued to 
monitor his activities and communications.  
4. Hypothetical #4—Unprepared County Jails 
Vernon Walton was arrested in Jefferson County for possession for the sale of 
rock cocaine. Like Forrest, he was sentenced to eight years in the county jail. Jefferson 
County was still adapting to the lengthy sentences being served by inmates. There was 
political and community pressure to increase rehabilitation efforts in the jail. No 
consideration had been given to the potential for radicalization to occur because of these 
long sentences. Very few deputies had been trained as TLOs, and none had received 
training in radicalization awareness. No staff at that facility had ever established contact 
with anyone from the CII, CGII, or their local fusion center. 
Walton had some exposure to the Muslim faith during a previous incarceration in 
state prison (CDCR). He began attending Islamic worship and prayer sessions in the jail, 
where he found charismatic leaders, some of whom were volunteers from outside and 
some fellow inmates. He was given a copy of The Noble Quran, which encourages 
violence toward non-Muslims. The jail had no policy regarding the vetting of volunteers 
who led worship services, nor did they have a practice of monitoring religious services. 
This deficiency allowed the radical ideology to spread with little interference.  
The untrained staff at the jail was not concerned about Walton’s activities, so they 
were not reported. It was later learned that several of Walton’s associates were under 
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investigation by the FBI. However, if Walton’s activities had been monitored and 
reported through proper channels, the FBI would have been able to connect those 
suspects through their association with Walton. 
D. OPTIONS 
Jail administrators currently have the option of not supporting the smart practices 
of these three models, either because of a lack of resources or a belief that “it won’t 
happen here.” While a resource-intensive intelligence unit is not appropriate for all jail 
facilities, some recommendations presented in this report can be implemented with little 
to no cost. According to the COPS office, the potential benefit to ensuring that critical 
intelligence is collected is “often greater than can be measured (such as the saving of 
lives), while the cost of implementing a formalized system is almost nonexistent.”156 The 
question is not whether a jail can afford to implement some of these recommendations, 
but rather whether they can afford not to. 
156 Matthews, Jail Information Model, 2. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It’s no longer about “need to know.” Our guiding principle is 
“responsibility to share.”157 
–James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence 
Research on this project began with the suspicion that as a result of inmates now 
serving much lengthier sentences in their facilities, many county jails in California were 
ill-prepared to address radicalization issues. After contacting the staff at a large sheriff’s 
department, where the average daily inmate population was approximately 5,000, this 
suspicion was confirmed. The research question for this thesis—How is it possible to 
ensure that jail staff effectively identify and document radicalization efforts occurring in 
their facilities, and that they report actionable homeland security intelligence to the 
appropriate entity?—was born out of that discovery. 
A. IMPLEMENTATION 
Examined for the purposes of this study were the policies and procedures at three 
agencies where radicalization issues had already been addressed. This chapter presents 
recommendations based on the findings in the previous chapters. This research has 
concluded with the following recommendations. 
1. Support 
Securing the support of the jail administrator is an important first step. The level 
of support required depends on the amount of resources the program will need. 
Implementing even a small program will result in the need to train staff. While much of 
the training itself is provided at no cost, travel, per diem, and costs to replace the 
employee absent for training time may be needed. If a jail administrator is not convinced 
of the necessity of devoting resources to controlling radicalization, that person could be 
157 James R. Clapper, “How 9/11 Transformed the Intelligence Community,” The Wall Street Journal, 
September 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111904537404576554430822300 
352#printMode. 
 51 
                                                 
encouraged to consult with either a jail administrator aware of this need, or with officials 
at the CII, the CGII, the local FBI field office, or the local fusion center.  
2. Training  
As many employees as possible should attend basic jail radicalization training. 
The fusion centers throughout California sponsor this course on a regular basis, and at no 
cost to participants (See Appendix C for sample announcement/course description). 
Receiving this training will ensure that the staff are not only aware of what to look for 
and to report, but, and equally as important, what NOT to report. For example, 
intelligence files must not cover activities protected by the First Amendment. 
The DHS, in defining the role of the fusion centers in combatting violent 
extremism, shared that one of their most vital roles is “Educating and informing state and 
local partners on behaviors and indicators of potential threats, while ensuring the 
protection of the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of individuals and 
constitutionally protected activities.” To this end, it provides funding to the fusion centers 
so that appropriate training is available. The DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties says, “Training must be accurate, based on current intelligence, and must 
include cultural competency training.”158 
As an example, investigative personnel from every BOP facility have received 
training in the control and management of terrorist inmates. Additional staff from some 
of the facilities have participated in intelligence gathering and analysis training provided 
by the FBI.159 The BOP provides more training to their staff on this topic than other 
prison and jail systems since convicted terrorists serve their sentences in BOP facilities. 
However, most of the terrorists in their custody spent time in a local jail between the date 
they were arrested and the date they were sentenced. Jail staff should be prepared to 
monitor these inmates properly. 
158 Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Training: 
Guidance & Best Practices, ed. Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2011). 
159 Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, 
Radicalization, Information Sharing and Community Outreach: Protecting the Homeland from Homegown 
Terror. 
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Some county jails may face a challenge not present in the prison systems. The 
BOP and CDCR prisons, and some county jails, are staffed by correctional officers, 
employees who have selected that career and often remain for many years. In contrast, 
deputy sheriffs staff a majority of the jails in California. In most counties, newer deputies 
are assigned to the jails until seniority earns them a transfer to patrol. This system makes 
the proposal in this study difficult to execute for two reasons. First, a constant rotation of 
personnel occurs, which means that valuable experience and training are lost when the 
employee transfers to patrol. Second, many deputies consider the jail a stepping stone in 
their career and choose not to develop an expertise in corrections. 
3. Monitoring 
The appropriate person(s) should establish a relationship with the personnel 
assigned to the CII. The CII’s main purpose is “to prevent potential acts of terrorism by 
inmates in the United States.”160 The CII has four subprojects.  
• General intelligence 
• Recruiting in custody 
• Development of inmate sources on terrorism matters 
• Inmates calling persons of concern161 
The second subproject, recruiting in custody, focuses on precisely what was 
covered in this research, detecting and deterring radicalization, including that conducted 
by religious service providers and other volunteers. 
Monitoring is divided into three areas: communications, observations, and 
activities.  
a. Communications  
Officers assigned to correctional facilities in California must attend a State of 
California approved “Adult Supplemental Core Course”—commonly only referred to as 
160 U.S. Department of Justice, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim 
Religious Service Providers, 27. 
161 Ibid. 
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“jail operations”—within their first year of assignment to a jail. Thirty minutes of this 
training is specifically dedicated to instructions about monitoring inmate telephone 
calls.162 
Inmate correspondence (mail and email) may also be monitored when “there is a 
valid security reason and the facility manager or his/her designee approves.”163 However, 
section 1063 (c) of the Minimum Jail Standards states, “jail staff shall not review inmate 
correspondence to or from state and federal courts, any member of the State Bar or holder 
of public office, and the Board of State and Community Corrections; however, jail 
authorities may open and inspect such mail only to search for contraband, cash, checks, 
or money orders and in the presence of the inmate.”164 
The BOP monitors all general mail sent to or from known terrorist prisoners. It is 
not delivered until it is examined and analyzed for intelligence purposes. Any content of 
potential interest is referred to the FBI.165 Those prisoners are required to deliver 
outgoing mail to prison staff to ensure that the true sender is identifiable.166 Consultation 
with the personnel from the U.S. Attorney’s Office and/or the FBI is recommended when 
a known terrorist is housed in a county jail. 
Where the technology exists, the monitoring of social visits is also recommended. 
The fact that these conversations are subject to monitoring has not completely deterred all 
prisoners from sharing valuable intelligence. Visits between the inmates and their 
attorney of record (and investigators for the attorney) may NOT be monitored. 
162 Board of State and Community Corrections, Adult Corrections Officer Core Course, ed. Standards 
and Training for Corrections Division (Sacramento, CA: Board of State and Community Corrections, 
2011), Module 13.5. 
163 Minimum Standards for Local Detention Facilities, (September 19, 2012), 1063 (b). 
164 Ibid., 1063 (c). 
165 Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, 
Radicalization, Information Sharing and Community Outreach: Protecting the Homeland from Homegown 
Terror, 2. 
166 Ibid., 3. 
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Unfortunately, some attorneys have delivered messages to and from the inmates to avoid 
law enforcement monitoring.167 
b. Observations 
The National Counterterrorism Center has suggested that law enforcement 
officers watch for imagery related to terrorist organizations. It can be found on jewelry, 
documents, and tattoos.168 Some examples can be seen in Figures 4–6. 
 
  
Figure 4.  Al-Qa’ida in Iraq169 Figure 5.  Al-Shabaab170 Figure 6.  Hamas171 
Crossed swords are generally recognized as symbols of war and/or force. In 
Figure 6 (Hamas), it is believed to “evoke jihad (holy war) and represent Hamas’s 
dedication to violent struggle.”172 Tattoos can also be indicative of support for radical 
ideology, just as they have been used to identify gang members and associates, as shown 
in Figure 7.   
 
167 Patrick T. Dunleavy, The Fertile Soil of Jihad: Terrorism’s Prison Connection (Washington, DC: 
Potomac Books, 2011), 102. 
168 “Terrorist Group Logos,” accessed October 20, 2014, http://nctc.gov/site/groups/index.html.  
169 Ibid.  
170 Ibid.  
171 Ibid. 
172 “Hamas (1),” accessed October 18, 2014, http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/hamas1.html.  
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Figure 7.  Tattoos Indicating Support for Hezbollah173 
c. Activities 
Radicalization efforts in the jails may be indicated by activity easily observed by 
staff who have received training on this topic. This training can include distribution of 
radical literature in the prison, contact with known radical clergy and other volunteers, 
and possession of materials indicative of radicalized ideology. Appendix A is an example 
of a document that should raise suspicion found in a cell. Referred to as “Blueprint 
2005,” it represents radicalized inmate Kevin James’ call to Jihad. It was modeled after 
the Manchester Document discussed at the beginning of Chapter II, and through it, James 
discussed recruitment strategies and instructed inmates to “communicate with brothers 
outside prison and exchange information that may be helpful to them in their work 
outside prison.”174 After ensuring that the activity is not constitutionally protected (for 
example, religious activities with no criminal nexus), the observations should be reported 
to the appropriate entity. 
4. Reporting 
The importance of reporting what may appear to be the most minor, insignificant 
piece of information cannot be overstated. That one small item may be the one that 
173 “The Counter Jihad Report,” accessed October 19, 2014, http://counterjihadreport.com/tag/ 
hezbollah-and-mexican-drug-cartels/. 
174 Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat, 131. 
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connects the dots that solves a crime or prevents a horrendous act from occurring. It is 
this type of information sharing that experts believe has “succeeded in thwarting major 
and minor attacks on Americans at home and abroad.”175 
The SAR process (also known as “Tips and Leads”) used throughout California is 
the most appropriate, efficient method of reporting information that may be of interest to 
homeland security officials. While it would benefit the employees to attend the basic 
TLO course to gain familiarity with the process prior to using it, it is not required. SARs 
may be reported to five of the six fusion centers shown in Figure 8 (the STAC being the 
exception), either by telephone or on their website (preferred). 
 
Figure 8.  State Threat Assessment System176 
175 Jonathan S. Landay, Marisa Taylor, and Greg Gordon, “In Wake of Boston Bombings, Experts Say 
Security Can Never Be Perfect,” April 16, 2013, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/16/188730/in-
wake-of-boston-bombings-experts.html#storylink=cpy. 
176 Tim Miller, “Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center” (presentation, State Threat 
Assessment System, Sacramento, CA, June 6, 2011). 
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If the role of the jail employees is to simply report observations, through the SAR 
process or otherwise, with no desire to maintain the information in their files, they would 
not be subject to the guidelines established for the operation of a criminal intelligence file 
system. Criminal intelligence information is defined as information that has been 
evaluated to determine that it: 
• Is relevant to the identification of and the criminal activity engaged in by 
an individual who or organization which is reasonably suspected of 
involvement in criminal activity 
• Meets the submission criteria required by 28 CFR § 23.20(b) 
If those conditions are present, specific policies should be adopted that govern the 
program. Such policies are mandated by Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 23 
(28 CFR 23). Any agency or division that intends to collect, analyze, retain, and 
disseminate criminal intelligence information should consider seeking specialized 
training to ensure that they comply with all legal requirements related to that material. 
The California Department of Justice, Bureau of Investigations and Intelligence, 
publishes a model standards and procedures manual, maintaining criminal intelligence 
files and criminal intelligence operational activities that contains many of the guidelines. 
It should not, however, be considered a substitute for appropriate training and 
consultation with legal advisors. 
5. Religion and Religious Services 
It is highly recommended that appropriate religious service providers (both 
volunteers and contractors) be selected to lead worship services and tend to the other 
spiritual needs of the inmates, as demonstrated in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9.  Muslims Praying in Prison177 
While case law does not entitle inmates to a chaplain of their faith, it is advisable 
to make every attempt to provide one who is knowledgeable about the faith with which 
they are assisting.178 In the Inspector General’s report on the BOP’s Selection of Muslim 
Religious Service Providers, the following excerpt appears: 
One of the BOP Muslim chaplains we interviewed asserted that 
contractors and volunteers have a stabilizing effect on Muslim inmates 
because they bring fresh opinions and societal experiences into the 
institutions, and inmates do not see them as part of the “police” like they 
see the chaplains. He said that fewer contractors and volunteers in the 
prisons make inmates feel more isolated and alienated, and leads to the 
germination of unsophisticated Islam, including radicalization and Prison 
Islam. Other chaplains also said that volunteers and contractors help to 
control radicalization, prevent misconceptions about Islam, and keep 
inmates from delivering their own sermons, taking their own 
interpretations of Islam, and controlling religious activities.179 
The selection process should not only screen out those not respected in the 
community, but also those whose personalities may allow them to become influenced, or 
even coerced by the stronger-willed inmates. The vetting process should also include a 
check with other jails and prisons to determine their history with other facilities. It would 
177 “Empowering Muslim Inmates in Prison,” accessed October 8, 2014, https://www.launchgood. 
com/project/minarafellowship. 
178 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2 (1972); Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817,820 (8th Cir. 1997); 
Blair-Bey v. Nix, 963 F.2d 162, 163–64 (8th Cir. 1992). 
179 U.S. Department of Justice, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim 
Religious Service Providers, 12. 
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be unwise to allow a religious service provider, paid or volunteer, access to a given 
facility if they have been banned from another institution. The screening process for all 
visitors, including religious service providers, should include a check with the National 
Crime Information Center (NCIC), and it queries the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). A 
TSC “hit” will prompt an immediate inquiry from the center and if the subject matches 
the identifiers in the TSC database, a representative from the local JTTF will likely 
contact the inquiring agency. 
Testifying before a Senate committee on the influence of Saudi-backed Wahhabi 
groups on U.S. prison populations in 2003, Senator Charles Schumer (D.-N.Y.) declared, 
“these organizations have succeeded in ensuring that militant Wahhabism is the only 
form of Islam that is preached to the 12,000 Muslims in federal prisons. The imams flood 
the prisons with anti-government, pro-bin Laden videos, literature, and sermon tapes.”180 
While certainly harsh, and probably inflated, his comments speak to the importance of 
ensuring that those who intend to preach extremist views are not provided with the 
captive audience that exists in jails.  
A somewhat controversial item on the subject of religion is The Noble Quran, as 
shown in Figure 10. Also known as the Hilali-Khan version, it was translated into English 
by Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali and Muhammad Muhsin Khan. Daveed 
Gartenstein-Ross, counter-terrorism scholar and Director of the Center for the Study of 
Terrorist Radicalization at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, testified, “This 
version was known for containing numerous interpolations not present in the original 
Arabic. Although ostensibly designed to explain the verses, these interpolations in fact 
pushed the meaning in a radical direction, one which was suffused with contempt for 
non-Muslims (particularly Jews and Christians), and one which was dedicated to 
fostering the global jihad.”181 Middle East Quarterly found that this translation “reads 
180 Hamm, Locking up Terrorists: Three Models for Controlling Prisoner Radicalization, 5. 
181 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization: Are 
Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?, 6. 
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more like a supremacist Muslim, anti-Semitic, anti-Christian polemic than a rendition of 
the Islamic scripture.”182  
 
Figure 10.  The Noble Qur'an183 
Frank Cilluffo testified, “Of particular concern is its appendix, entitled “The Call 
to Jihad (Holy Fighting in Allah’s Cause).” The Noble Quran is not permitted in BOP 
facilities, appears to be permitted in the CDCR facilities, but no open source information 
indicates that it has been banned from LASD facilities.  
Jail administrators should also ensure that staff receive cultural awareness 
training. Anti-Muslim prejudice should not be tolerated. Discrimination against Muslims, 
or “Islamophobia,” has been found to “provide the pretext for–and one of the drivers 
behind–radicalisation (sic) and extremist recruitment in Muslim minority countries.”184 
This causal factor would likely be intensified when the discrimination is exhibited by jail 
staff, because of the frequency of contact and the “keeper-kept” relationship. 
182 Khaleel Mohammed, “Assessing English Translations of the Qur’an,” Middle East Quarterly 12, 
no. 2 (Spring 2005): 58–71, http://www.meforum.org/717/assessing-english-translations-of-the-quran. 
183 “The Noble Quran Transliteration in Roman Script,” accessed October 11, 2014, http://www. 
islamicapproach.com/noble-quran-transliteration-roman-script-p-1512.html. 
184 Neumann, Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation in 15 Countries, 36. 
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B. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Following his extensive study on prison radicalization, Mark S. Hamm provided a 
number of recommendations suitable for implementation at the county jail level. 
• Similar to the strategy currently employed by the BOP, it is recommended 
that state maximum-security correctional institutions seek full-time 
Muslim chaplains.  
• Correctional agencies should encourage Muslim American entry into the 
state prison workforce. 
• Chaplains and intelligence officers should come together on a regular 
basis to share intelligence on prisoner radicalization, religious 
proselytizing, high profile inmates, and inmate hierarchies. It is 
recommended that federal law enforcement join this effort as well.  
• Prison staffs should receive daily roll-call training on prisoner 
radicalization and potential terrorist recruitment.185 
C. CONCLUSION 
In an article published by the FBI in 2011 titled Radicalization of Islamist 
Terrorists in the Western World, the authors wrote, “Radicalization, especially of Islamist 
extremists, only recently has become a serious research topic of law enforcement 
organizations, intelligence agencies, and academia.”186 Unfortunately, the need to 
continue this research is on the rise. Recently, every week has brought a new story of 
U.S. citizens who have radicalized to some degree. Their actions include supporting 
terrorist organizations,187 the beheading a co-worker,188 and travelling (or attempting to 
185 Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of 
Non-Traditional Faith Groups Final Report, 119–120. 
186 “Perspective,” 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-
bulletin/september-2011/perspective.  
187 Office of Public Affairs, “Three Defendants Arrested on Charges of Providing Material Support to 
a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” Department of Justice, July 23, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/three-defendants-arrested-charges-providing-material-support-foreign-terrorist-organization.  
188 Patrick Howley, “House Chairman Tells Holder: Investigate Beheading for Terrorism, not 
‘Workplace Violence,’” The Daily Caller, September 30, 2014, http://dailycaller.com/2014/09/30/house-
chairman-tells-holder-investigate-beheading-for-terrorism-not-workplace-violence/. 
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travel) to Syria to fight alongside ISIS.189 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 made very clear the expectation that federal, state, and local 
entities shall share terrorism-related information.190  
It seems clear that many California jails, at least in the 34 counties of the Eastern 
District of California (CCIC’s area of operation), are not prepared to monitor and report 
radicalization efforts should they occur in their facilities. Indicators of preparedness 
efforts would include providing training to their staff, submitting SARs to the appropriate 
fusion center, and establishing relationships with the CGII, CCIC, and CII. However, 
• County jail staff attendance at the basic TLO courses offered in the CCIC 
AOR has not increased.  
• The Inmate Radicalization Awareness course has not been offered in 
Northern California in the past year. When it was offered in San Diego in 
September 2014, the researcher was the only Northern California attendee. 
These two facts indicate that jail staff in Northern California and the CCIC 
AOR are not receiving training on this topic. 
• A review of submitted SARs (released by the CCIC in compliance with a 
Public Records Act request) indicate very few originating in jail facilities.  
Of course, jail and prison employees are already keeping a close eye on inmate 
activities, for the safety and security of all involved. However, what has changed now is 
the nature of what they need to watch for. Lost opportunities can lead to devastating 
consequences. Following the guidelines and suggestions outlined in this thesis will ensure 
that any actionable intelligence about possible radicalization can and will be reported to 
the proper agencies in a timely manner. 
189 “FBI Director Comey Says Roughly a Dozen Americans Fighting with Extremist Group, October 
5, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/10/05/fbi-director-comey-says-roughly-dozen-americans-
known-to-be-fighting-with/.  
190 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 108–458, Section 1067. 
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Figure 11.  Blueprint 2005191 
191 “Blueprint 2005,” accessed October 12, 2014, http://www.investigativeproject.org/case/129. 
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Figure 12.  Operations Order192 
 
 
192 Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, Correctional Services Operations Order 1/08 
(Sacramento, CA: Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, 2008). 
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Figure 13.  Radicalization Training Flyer193 
193 “Inmate Radicalization Awareness,” accessed October 2, 2014, https://sd-
lecc.org//files/EBF%5C20150218%20Inmate%20Radicalization%20-%20SD.pdf. 
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